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ABOUT THE BRITISH ASSOCIATION FOR KOREAN STUDIES AND *BAKS PAPERS*

The British Association for Korean Studies (BAKS) was founded in 1987 as a forum to host conferences and workshops on Korean Studies around the UK. At such events, papers have been presented on a wide range of subjects including archaeology, art, economics, literature, politics, and society. BAKS continues to hold annual conferences, sometimes in partnership with her sister organisations, The British Association for Chinese Studies (BACS) and The British Association for Japanese Studies (BAJS).

Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies (BAKS Papers) was founded in 1991 to publish the editorially approved transactions of the then annual conferences of the Association. The journal has for several years actively solicited submissions from outside the conferences as well. Fifteen volumes have been published to date, the latest two issues being available only online.

Initially the quality of *BAKS Papers* was maintained by an internal editorial board and the editor. Since Volume 14 (2012), *BAKS Papers* became a fully peer-reviewed journal. There was established an external editorial board of 20 international scholars covering a range of areas within the humanities and the social sciences. The Editorial Board is under the leadership of the Editor. There are prescribed rules for the examination of submissions and regulations for writers making a submission. Just under half of the submissions (including external submissions) were rejected for publication in Volume 15 (2013).

Since its inception in the late 1980s, the *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* has focussed on modern and contemporary Korea but has not neglected traditional culture and history. For example, Volume 5 (1994) was a special issue devoted to archaeology and material culture. The journal has published other special issues, such as Volume 6 which focussed on 'Nationality and Nationalism in East Asia', reflecting the Association's broader interests in contemporary East Asia, and Volume 14 (2012) which focussed on British witnesses to the social, cultural, political and economic changes in late twentieth-century Korea.

ABOUT THE *EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF KOREAN STUDIES*

At the General Meeting for The British Association for Korean Studies in London on 9 September 2016 the Association decided to re-launch *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* (BAKS Papers) as the *European Journal of Korean Studies*.

The new name better reflects the existing breadth of the editorial board as well as the extensive range of submissions that result from expanded offerings on Korean Studies across the European continent, including Great Britain. Using our experience gained in publishing the *BAKS Papers* over the last 25 years, we are delighted to relaunch the publication as a Europe-wide journal dedicated to Korean Studies.

BAKS Papers has been blind, peer-reviewed since volume 15, and the *European Journal of Korean Studies* will carry on being blind, peer-reviewed. The new *Journal* will be published twice a year, rather than just annually. It is the only English-language journal in Europe devoted to the broad field of Korean Studies, and we hope that it will become the show-case journal for the outstanding work on Korea being done in Europe.

First published in 1991 and originally available in printed format, *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* (informally known as *BAKS Papers*) is now exclusively available on-line through the Association's website. Volumes 1–16 are available for download, as will future issues of the *European Journal of Korean Studies*. The *Journal* is free to BAKS members and those who want copies should contact Tristan Webb: treasurer@baks.org.uk.

Editors

EDITOR'S NOTE

Swimming against the Brexit tide, *The Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* has become, after sixteen volumes, the *European Journal of Korean Studies*. This first issue (though maintaining the volume numbers of the *BAKS Papers*) of the *EJKS* contains two fine research articles, one from Moscow and the other from Australia, as well as an essay from a famous scholar based in New York but delivered in London. Given the cross-channel branding of this journal, the next volume will have content of a more European nature, featuring articles from scholars based in Oslo and Berlin.

Following the recent unexpected outbreak of inter-Korean connectivity, Natalia Kim offers a timely exploration of the memoirs of two of South Korea's more liberal Presidents. Kim considers the nature and practice of the construction of history as well as the nature of useful academic sources and materials in that nation, whose collective memory can sometimes be a challenging research environment. David Kim moves swiftly and skilfully through an expansive collection of Australian religious organisation material, which describe the sourcing of foreign medical aid during the Korean War. Korea and four other states in the era of Westphalian nationhood are featured in Charles Armstrong's special lecture. Armstrong's historical framing is particularly important given that the relationship between the United States and North Korea remains at an extremely high temperature.

The inclusion of research notes gives the *Journal* some more flexibility to publish works and ideas in progress. In my own case, I offer a piece in this issue focusing on the work of the legendary scholar of Asian frontiers Owen Lattimore. As is traditional, this issue of the *EJKS* is also home to some intriguing book reviews addressing works on colonial Korea (an area where we particularly encourage article submissions), anarchism, linguistic explorations of the Chinese-North Korean border, North Korea itself, and the prospects for unification on the peninsula.

The community of Koreanists in Europe has deep roots and is currently in a very healthy state. We look forward to making the *European Journal of Korean Studies* a showcase for scholarship on Korea across Europe and connecting with the wider networks and ecosystems of Korean Studies beyond.

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POLITICAL MEMOIRS AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN SOUTH KOREA: TURNING POINTS IN THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS OF KIM TAEJUNG AND NO MUHYŎN

Natalia Kim

School of Asian Studies in the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow and Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Abstract

The research in this paper focuses on the autobiographical writings of two outstanding political figures, the former presidents of South Korea, Kim Taejung (1998–2003) and No Muhyŏn (2003–2008). The study aims to define how the individual memories of a past are interwoven with collective memories and reflected in life narratives. The research focuses on Kim Taejung's written memories of the liberation period (1945–1948), the Korean War (1950–1953), the April Revolution (1960), and No Muhyŏn's oral recollections of the April Revolution (1960) and of the May 16 coup (1961). Kim Taejung and No Muhyŏn have used different forms of personal writing, autobiography and memoir, to record their private recollections, which are testimonies of the authors' past experience. In this regard, they are especially helpful resources for understanding how collective memory of the past has been formed and mobilized in South Korea.

The preliminary results of the research show that the individual memories of two politicians regarding significant historical events considerably contest and criticize the official historical discourse. In their autobiographical writings, Kim Taejung and No Muhyŏn argue that the past is not something settled and unaltered; it is a subject of continuous rethinking and revision. Through open criticism of the past mistakes of South Korean government and politicians, they oppose the unilateralism of the official historical discourse, which for decades has been forming on various misconceptions and limited information on socio-political realities of the modern Korean history. The lack of reliable information on the most significant events of the modern Korean history led to forming collective memory based on the oblivion of the tragic pages

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in the history of Korea. Kim Taejung and No Muhyŏn believe that Koreans should remember the past in all its diversity and complexity to prevent the future mistakes. Continuous questioning, criticism, and focusing on impressions of the past events are the basic methods which both authors use to separate their individual remembrances from collective memory in the life narrative.

Key words: autobiography, political memoir, collective memory, individual memory, life narrative, the April Revolution of 1960, Korean War, liberation of Korea

POLITICAL MEMOIRS AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN SOUTH KOREA: TURNING POINTS IN THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS OF KIM TAEJUNG AND NO MUHYŎN

Natalia Kim

Introduction

Emerging as an independent nation in 1948, South Korea went through a difficult phase of political development shifting from a martial and authoritarian regime toward a liberal–democratic one. The April Revolution in 1960, the May 16 coup in 1961, the October Yusin in 1972, the Kwangju Uprising in 1980, and the June Democratic Uprising are the turning points of South Korean history which changed the political landscape of the state and extensively influenced its future. The successful democratic transition has provided substantial grounds for various interpretations of the critical moments in the contemporary history of Korea. Although the official historical discourse has become more democratic and critical in recent times, it still leans towards conservatism. The collective memory of important historical events has been continuously constructed by a wide range of educational tools, cultural products, and governmental programs in South Korea. The collective memory comprises individual memories of the past, but these individual memories are subordinate to the collective memory because they are subject to generalization and objectification, which result in the adoption of commonly shared views of the past. There are different sources through which the interdependence of collective memory and individual memories can be studied. One of them is an autobiography.

Autobiographies are one of oldest literary genres. Although the term 'autobiography' appeared relatively late in English literature, in the 19th century, memoirs and diaries, both autobiographical forms of literary expression, have a much longer history. Throughout history, people have recollected and reconstructed their personal lives through individual memory, capturing the most significant events of the past in various types of autobiographical writings. In everyday life, 'autobiography' and 'memoir' (reminiscence) are often used as interchangeable notions because both of them refer to recollecting the past events of an individual's life. However, there is a small difference between these two terms. The autobiography is a shaping of the

past, and, as such, it 'involves the reconstruction of the movement of a life, or part of a life, in the actual circumstances in which it was lived'.[1] An autobiographer focuses on the self, while the author of a memoir tends to recollect his own life in the context of the others who have influenced it. This difference in approach to recollecting the past implies a difference in the structure of a memoir versus an autobiography. As a rule, an autobiographer recollects the past events of his life from childhood to the most significant events of the recent past. In a memoir, there are no rules that strictly prescribe the order of narration: an author is absolutely free to choose those events that seem to him as the most important. Hence, in memoir the chronological coherence of narration is less meaningful than in an autobiography.

Autobiographical writings are quite difficult to be analyzed because their authors are not bound by specific rules or formal requirements of narration. As James Olney correctly noted in his theoretical essay on autobiography, the autobiographer is restrained by neither necessary models nor 'obligatory observances gradually shaped out of a long developing tradition'.[2] The obvious simplicity of the autobiographical writing resulted in a large number of memoirs, personal essays, letters, diaries, autobiographies. The absence of specific rules or formal requirements of narration in autobiographies should not be misunderstood to mean that there are not any rules of narration at all.

The autobiographer needs to be cohesive and accurate in his representation of the facts. Being an account of one's own life, the autobiography as a literary genre imposes certain restrictions on its author; thus, accuracy, impartiality, and inclusiveness are the basic requirements of autobiographical writing.[3] The style is also an important device of the skilled narrator, but in regard to autobiographical writing, its significance is less meaningful. Although many autobiographies are written in the simplest style, it does not make them less interesting for a potential reader. Moreover, the simplest stylistic choice sometimes permits to achieve 'larger effects, like those of metaphor and tone'.[4]

Autobiographical writings reflect the memories of the authors about their pasts. Thus, life narratives are the places, in which someone's memories are recollected and organized to contribute to an evolving story of the self. Historical narratives and individual and collective are so closely interwoven in autobiographies that none of them can remove the influence of the other. The autobiographical genre determines to a certain extent the way in which the memories will be reflected in the text, but it cannot influence the process of recollecting the past. In turn, the past can be organized only through individual or collective memories, which overlap in the process of recollecting. As a result, analyzing political memories in the autobiographical writings, we have to take into account not only a particular form of a narrative to which the memories follow but a process of recollecting events. This approach

allows us to understand the links and interconnections between narrative, individual memory and historical conscience (collective memory).

In the contemporary life narrative/oral history interpretive theory there are three general strands, according to which written/oral narratives are analyzed: cultural, social and psychological forms of analysis. The cultural form of analysis attempts to define how individual memories draw upon archetypal myths that are embodied in collective memory and, then, follow particular narrative forms. The social and psychological forms of analysis 'focus upon the context within which remembering takes place, and upon shared psychological imperatives underlying the construction of stories about the past'.[5] All three forms of analysis commonly share a theoretical assumption of Halbwachs: individual memory is mainly subservient to collective memory, and, hence, can hardly escape from the templates of the latter. Halbwachs wrote that 'our memories remain collective, however, and are recalled to us through others even though only we were participants in the events or saw the things concerned'.[6] The continuous presence of others in our individual lives influences the process of remembrances so that even succession of our private memories should be explained through the changes that occur in our relationships to various collective milieus.[7]

In this study, I explore the interdependence of autobiographical writings' narrative and individual memory based on an analysis of Kim Taejung's written memories of the liberation period (1945–1948), the Korean War, and the April Revolution (1960) and based on an analysis of No Muhyŏn's oral recollections of the April Revolution (1960) and the May 16 coup (1961). Carried out in accordance with the basic elements of cultural, social and psychological dimensions of analysis of oral history, this study argues that individual memories of Kim Taejung and No Muhyŏn differ considerably from the collective memory of past events, particularly in those parts of the life narrative that reflects the author's specific experience of the past. Through these disputed points, private remembrances manifest their capacity to contest dominant historical discourse and, thus, resist the templates of collective memory.

Critical remarks on the autobiographical writings of Kim Taejung and No Muhyŏn

To determine how historical events are recollected by individual memories in an autobiographical writing, it is important to understand the goal of the writing and 'the author's standpoint of the moment at which he reviews his life and interprets his life from it'.[8] It is also important to know the individual conditions in which an autobiographer is when he writes his memoir. The last one is especially significant for political memoir because they are written by professional statesmen and politicians

whose conscience and memories are strongly dependent on the current politics. In addition, we must distinguish what kind of memories we are dealing with—oral or written. Oral memories are reflected in the text in a different manner than written ones, and, as a consequence, it causes a different perception of author's recollections of the history.

Kim Taejung wrote his autobiography after his retirement in 2003. The political career was practically finished, and he had enough time to think over the past, to reevaluate, and to reconstruct his life in the autobiography. The full edition of Kim Taejung's autobiography in two volumes was published in 2010, after his death (August 18, 2009). The preface opens with the commemorative letters of his second wife Yi Hŭiho, the ex-president of the USA, Bill Clinton, the ex-president of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the ex-president of Germany, Richard von Weizsäcker. It also contains Kim Taejung's general reflections on his life and the aims of his autobiography. In the preface, Kim Taejung clearly stated that he wanted to become a president who would change the world. He was completely convinced that a political leader greatly influences the historical development of a country by his actions. It was for this reason that Kim Taejung took part in the presidential elections four times, and, as a consequence, was accused of being sick with 'presidential illness' by his political opponents. However, as Kim Taejung noted, he had never quarreled with such accusations.[9]

During his long ascent to the presidency, Kim Taejung met many people, who went through sufferings and hardships to help him and those who even sacrificed their lives for him. In his autobiography, he wanted to recall the names of these people once again to thank them. This was the first aim of the writing. The second purpose was to educate the next generation so that they would not repeat the mistakes that he had made during his political career. This purpose of autobiographical writing is formulated within the framework of the traditional Korean historiography in which the most important aim of the historical writing is to educate the statesmen on how to justly and impartially govern. As a consequence, Kim Taejung's autobiography may be interpreted as his last message to the people, and especially, to the future political leaders.[10] It exemplifies the instructive character of his life narrative; it is full of personal comments on the past and moral instructions.

The aims of the autobiographical writing exemplified the special author's standpoint in which Kim Taejung analyzed past events. Kim Taejung identified himself as a politician, and, as a consequence, he factually wrote the political memoir, recollecting his life in the context of the ongoing political situation. A very small part of his autobiography is devoted to his life before he had started to actively participate in politics in 1954. Throughout his storytelling Kim Taejung focused on those historical events that occurred as the result of unreasonable, selfish, and corruptible actions of the governing political elite. Thus, he wanted to emphasize

the close interconnection between civilians and politicians and between society, its development and the role of a political leader. In this regard, the most significant events, from the author's standpoint, are those in which people become a victim of the unreasonable, unfair policies of the political leadership. If these types of events are caused by the subjective will of the politicians, there are also others that occur objectively as a consequence of multiple factors, e.g., the Korean War, the April Revolution (1960), etc. The narration of Kim Taejung's autobiography is structured around these two types of events, which makes it coherent and logical.

The No Muhyŏn's memoirs were published after his death on May 23, 2009. In this year, the Institute for Future Development (*hangukmiraebaljeonyeonguwon*/한국미래발전연구원) and the No Muhyŏn's Foundation (*nomuhyeonjaedan*/노무현재단) published a series of works in memory of the deceased president (September, 2009). Although most of the writings were formally published on behalf of No Muhyŏn, factually, they were prepared by No Muhyŏn's colleagues and friends. These works included No Muhyŏn's letters, interviews, public statements, articles during and after his presidency. Specifically they covered the period from 25 February 2003 to 24 February of 2008. One of the most noteworthy publications is the book, 'Success and Frustration' (*seonggonggwa jwajeol*/성공과 좌절), which contains the diary entries and memories of No Muhyŏn. The diary entries appear in a chapter also entitled 'Success and Frustration.' The title of the chapter clearly reflects the content of the published memoirs. No Muhyŏn expresses his ideas on the subject of success (i.e., What is a success? What does it mean to be a successful president? How to achieve success?), the historical development of Korea, and various political issues. No Muhyŏn's memoirs were published preserving the author's style but with a revised orthography. The diary notes are not dated. According to the editorial remarks, the content published in the 'Success and Frustration' was written after No Muhyŏn's retirement during his stay in his home village of Pongha. The last diary entry in this chapter is dated May 20, 2009, three days before his suicide.

In addition to the diary entries, 'Success and Frustration' contains No Muhyŏn's notes, which were originally posted on the web pages of the No Muhyŏn Foundation with limited access to those members of the Internet-café, 'Bongha Gulmadang' (봉하글마당) and the Society for Study of Progressivism (*jinbojuuiyeongumoim*/진보주의연구모임). In comparison with the diary entries, these notes are dated March–May, 2009. The last note placed on the web page of the Internet-cafe is dated May 21, 2009. The defining theme is the future of progressive democracy in South Korea. No Muhyŏn raised the questions of what kind of problems Korea encounters in the process of development; he also discussed what countries could be useful to study for settling the current developmental issues.

The third types of writings that were included in 'Success and Frustration' are No Muhyŏn's oral recollections of his childhood, his days as a practicing lawyer, and

the policies of the 'participation government' (*chamyeojeongbu*/참여정부) during his presidency. Throughout his presidency, No Muhyŏn was harshly criticized by the conservative mass media in South Korea for the 'bad work' of his government. To neutralize the negative assessments of the 'participation government's' policies, No Muhyŏn decided to record his memories, which would reflect his own vision of the government's initiatives. Therefore, in the Blue House (the president's residence) from September 2007 to January 2008, the officers of the presidential administration recorded No Muhyŏn's memories of his childhood, political activities, and some reflections on the future development of Korea. Partly, these records were used in the documentary 'The president talks about the 'participation government' (KTV, 11 November 2007) and in the DVD-film 'Five years of the 'participation government'' (February 2008). However, for the first time, the full records of No Muhyŏn's memories were published in the 'Success and Frustration.'

As noted, the autobiographical writings of Kim Taejung and No Muhyŏn include different types of memories—written and oral. The oral memories, as a rule, are very fragmented and emotional. Oral memories reflect, first of all, individual's impression of the historical event witnessed. As a rule, they are not dated and properly structured. With some exceptions, No Muhyŏn does not operate with precise dates and figures recalling the significant events of the past. To distinguish events in time, he says 'before' or 'after the April revolution,' 'the day when Cho Byŏngok died,' 'when I was finishing the 1st grade of the middle school', 'after the unification of three parties' (1990), etc. The spontaneity of recollections makes it necessary to appeal to additional historical sources which contain more precise information on the recorded events. Otherwise, it is difficult to analyze the fragmented evidence of No Muhyŏn's oral recollections.

Unlike No Muhyŏn's oral memories of the April Revolution, Kim Taejung's written memories reflected upon the political situation in Masan, Seoul in March–April 1960 in more detailed and mature manner. In this sense, the oral memories of No Muhyŏn seem spontaneous and inconsistent, whereas Kim Taejung's memories are more precise, coherent, and rational. Regarding these recollections, the division of written versus oral memories seems to be a more complicated than that proposed by Halbwachs, which was to distinguish childhood remembrances from adult ones.[11] No Muhyŏn's memories of the April Revolution and the May 16th coup are childhood remembrances (in 1960, he was only 14 years old), and, as a consequence, are fragmented and illusive in terms of Halbwachs's theory. However, if we analyze No Muhyŏn's adult remembrances of the past, it becomes obvious that all his oral memories reflect his perception of the events more clearly than written memories of Kim Taejung. This raises the question: are written memories better suited to the memory-in-process, while oral memories should be identified with the memory of reception? I mean that as results of long consideration of the past events written

memories can be more cohesive and detailed than oral memories. These are the memories which are in the process of construction. It allows identification with the memory-in-process whereas oral memories should be identified with the memory of reception because they are results of spontaneous recollecting, inconsistent and focused on the people's emotions caused by the past event. If this division of memories is true, then it explains why No Muhyŏn's oral recollections are reflexive, discursive, and self-questioning. He does not aim to depict how an event has happened; instead, he wants to show his impressions and feelings about it and how the latter influenced his future behavior choices.

Kim Taejung written recollections of the historical events

Kim Taejung was 19 when Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial regime. This liberation started a three-year transitional period, which finished with the division of Korea into two independents states in 1948. The era of liberation (1945–1948) is extensively explored in the modern historiography.[12] The political history of this time figures as a period of the tense socio-political standoff, which involved national groups and international forces. It is a view commonly shared by scholars to divide the Korean political groups into the rightists, the centrists, and the leftists while leaving open the question of ideological contradictions between these three directions. However, it is assumed that due to the ideological affinity of certain political groups with foreign forces such as the USSR and the US, South Korean communists, on the whole, adhered to the politics of the USSR within the Korean Peninsula, while the extreme right-wing nationalist groups adhered to those of the US. The centrists, moderate left- and right-wingers, took a more balanced position on relations with the USSR and the US. As I have noted elsewhere, 'recognizing the enormous influence of the two powers on the liberation of Korea, they tried to develop a 'third way' without copying entirely from either Western or Soviet model of development'.[13]

In his memories of the liberation period Kim Taejung reflects upon the most significant political issues and figures of the time, mentioning both the rightists, the centrists, and the leftists. Though he had few concerns about politics at that time, he actively participated in the activities of the Mokpo's branch of the Preparatory Committee for Establishing a new State (*Konguk junbi wiwonhwe*). He wrote that initially there were no ideological clashes between the leftists and the rightists within the Mokpo's branch, all equally participated in the Preparatory Committee. But some time later the communists grasped the power in the Mokpo's branch. Kim Taejung explains that most young Koreans had no particular disapproval of communism at the time because they heard much about the desperate struggle of Communists against Japanese colonialism. Commenting his own views on the communism, Kim

Taejung wrote that having lived in the dark time of Japanese imperialism, he did not understand democracy or communism. In 1945, he was a 21-year-old young man enthusiastically embracing the ongoing political changes in Korea. He was delighted to work as a head of the propaganda department at the Mokpo's branch of the Preparatory Committee, thus expressing a willingness to sacrifice his youth to re-establish Korean statehood. Kim Taejung rhetorically asks in his autobiography whether there was more important commitment than this one.[14]

On more than one occasion, Kim Taejung contemplates past events in terms of their historical context, stressing how collective memory evolves to reflect particular events differently over time. He wrote that, at first, the division of Korea did not cause special concerns for Koreans because they believed that sooner or later it would be united again. Furthermore, many people did not worry about the American and Soviet troops that were occupying Korea. The more eye-catching issue was the political division between the leftists and the rightists soon after liberation. The political tensions were exacerbated by the different attitudes of the Korean nationalists and communists on the issue of trusteeship. At first, all political groups, the rightists, the leftists, and the centrists, were against trusteeship. However, after the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the UK and the US (16–26 December 1945) The Central People's Committee (of the Korean People's Republic) and the Communist Party headed by Pak Hŏnyŏng suddenly changed their attitude on the trusteeship and unfurled public campaigns for its support throughout the country. Kim Taejung wrote that he was also initially against a trusteeship regime, but later he has changed his mind. He said that Koreans' unwillingness to accept trusteeship could result in the division of Korea, and from this standpoint, an adoption of trusteeship was a much better option than a rejection of it.

In order to sustain political consolidation, in the summer of 1946, there was formed the Coalition Committee of the rightists and the leftists in South Korea. One of the outstanding figures of the coalition movement was Yŏ Unhyŏng. Kim Taejung supported the coalition movement and even decided to join the New People's Party (*Sinmin-dang*). How did he explain his decision? Kim Taejung wrote that after liberation the only news that came from Seoul [Sŏul] to Mokp'o were about the clashes between Korean political groups. He regretted that after the long-awaited liberation from the Japanese colonialism Koreans rushed into a fight each other.

> Is it not regrettable that after decades of struggling against Japan and final liberation from its power Koreans have started to fight each other? Can not you reach a compromise by little concessions to each other? If Koreans go on fighting like this, it will result in the division of Korea. Is it reasonable to fight each other to achieve the independence? Indeed who are these people who are trying to control a situation in Korea after liberation in their own way? Cannot they behave more honestly before the nation and history?.[15]

It is not difficult to guess that Kim Taejung's criticism was targeted at the extreme rightists and communists who did not support the coalition movement initiated by Yŏ Unhyŏng and Kim Kyushik. In the light of subsequent developments, it is important to note that Kim Taejung saw the coalition movement as the only way to prevent the division of Korea. For this reason, he decided to join the New People's Party which had supported the coalition movement. However, soon after, he withdrew his membership because of the political beliefs of Korean communists who formed the majority of the party. He heard how the communists, the members of the New People's Party, openly praised the USSR calling it 'our motherland' (*joguk*) and the Red Banner (*jeokki*) 'our flag.' Kim Taejung flew into a rage when he heard such assessments of the USSR. Even if it was true that the USSR had liberated Korea, he thought that it did not allow Korean communists to call the Soviet Union 'our motherland.' Kim Taejung wrote that after this conflict with the communist members of the New People's Party he had no illusions about the Communist Party.[16]

Kim Taejung recollected how the New People's Party, the People's Party, and the Communist Party merged into the South Korean Labor Party. A little earlier, the same process of unification of the leftists had occurred in North Korea where in August 1946 the North Korean Labor Party headed by Kim Il-sung was created. Kim Taejung noted that since the creation of the South Korean Labor Party the political tensions between the leftists and the rightists increased.[17] In that regard, it is worth mentioning Yŏ Unhyŏng's comments on the future of the coalition movement. He did not support the merging of three political parties because of serious disagreements with Pak Hŏnyŏng, a leader of the Communist Party, on the collaboration of the leftists and the rightists within the Coalition Committee.[18] In November 1946, Yŏ Unhyŏng and Paek Namun created the Socialist Labor Party. However, it could not save the coalition movement from political collapse. In his letter to Kim Il-sug and Kim Doo-bong on November 10, 1946, Yŏ Unhyŏng wrote:

> I cannot guarantee any results from the Coalition Committee. I do not know whether I can stop the breaking of the left wing which is facing South Korea with a very difficult situation. In my opinion, reconvening of the Joint Commission is the only means of saving the country. Only the reopening of the Joint Commission will help the left wing to form a single party. Comrades, please make every effort for the reconvention of the Joint Commission.[19]

In spite of great efforts of Yŏ Unhyŏng to sustain the Coalition Committee, it was dissolved in December 1946. According to Kim Taejung, the attempts to unite the leftists and the rightists in South Korea finally failed with an assassination of Yŏ Unhyŏng on July 19, 1947. Kim Taejung called Yŏ Unhyŏng an outstanding political leader, who tried to save the nation after liberation but finally became a victim of the mercenary clique rushing to power.[20]

Although Kim Taejung did not share the communist view on the nation-building, he could hardly be labeled anti-communist. He found the rhetoric of communism and its political radicalism dangerous because he thought they were contradictory to the idea of a peaceful restoration of the Korean state based on the principles of national sovereignty and democracy. However, he never said, as Syngman Rhee [Ri Sŭngman] used to, that communism was an evil that ought to be completely extricated from Korean politics and people's consciences. In this sense, Kim Taejung was obviously nationalistic in his political attitudes. Moreover, Kim Taejung never asserted that the various forms of social protests during the liberation period—October uprising in Taegu, 1946, Jeju [Cheju] upheaval, April 1948—were a reaction to a series of upheavals caused by inflammatory and provocative actions of Korean communists. He appears to be neutral in his political assessment of these tragic events, which resulted in a large loss of civilians.

In his assessment of the Jeju upheaval, Kim Taejung followed the major findings of the Jeju April 3 Incident investigation report that was submitted by the National Committee for investigation of the truth about the Jeju April 3 Incident in 2003.[21] According to the report, all casualties of the Jeju upheaval (officially, the Jeju April 3 Incident, or 4.3 *sageon*), including the insurgents, should be determined as victims. Thus, the insurgents were finally granted a victim status, though until that time they were considered criminals in South Korea. The report's findings caused intense criticism of the right-wing political opposition, scholars, and the relatives of the dead police officers, soldiers. The Association of Bereaved Families of Victims of the Jeju April 3th Uprising for Historical Truth published a series of works harshly criticizing the report of the National Committee. The opposition-minded scholar wrote that 'If the April 3rd Incident is a resistance movement, then its leaders cannot possibly be victims; they are proponents of a communist revolution who were killed in action'.[22]

These disputes show how the individual memories of the Jeju upheaval based on the anti-communist stereotypes contradict with those which are free of hatred against communism. For Kim Taejung all Koreans who died in the Jeju upheaval or in Yosu-Suncheon rebellion [Yŏsu-Sunch'ŏn] October 1948) were victims. He wrote that the ground smeared with blood when the national army rushed to suppress the insurgents in Yosu, Suncheon (October 1948), and Jeju. These incidents became a precursor of the Korean War. 'The bloody Sunday was coming, but we were completely unaware of it', he wrote.[23]

The main subject of Kim Taejung's criticism was politicians, whom he blamed for politically unreasonable behavior, or selfishness, hypocrisy, and lies. Consequently, throughout his remembrances of the liberation period and the political history of the First Republic (1948–1960), Kim Taejung sharply criticized Syngman Rhee. He wrote that the election of Syngman Rhee became possible because of the wrong political course followed by Kim Gu, who, firstly, had not supported the coalition

movement, and, secondly, had rejected taking part in the parliamentary elections of 1948. As a result, Syngman Rhee was able to gain power, and this was the start of the tragic history of South Korea. Why? Kim Taejung says that Syngman Rhee came to power with the solid support of Korean collaborators, who implemented policies that exclusively satisfied their interests. While the Korean collaborators were successfully earning money and their descendants could get the best education, the activists of the national liberation movement were doomed to poor and miserable lives.[24] Kim Taejung thought that if Kim Ku and his group had gained power in 1948, it would have prevented a terrible slaughter and sufferings of thousands of South Korean civilians during the Korean War (1950–1953).

At the outbreak of the Korean War, Kim Taejung was in Seoul, having traveled there for business. He had heard about the invasion by North Korean troops on the radio, but, as he wrote, he was not too concerned about it. At the time, they had heard much about enemy provocations along the 38th parallel, and every time an attack occurred, the South Korean government assured people that it was immediately repelled by the national army. As Kim Taejung wrote, 'I still remember the words of Sin Sŏngmo, the Minister of Defense', who said that 'as soon as the president orders our national army will reach Pyongyang for four days, and to the Yalu river—within a week, granting its waters to the president (*geu gangmureul daetongryeongege bachigessda*/그 강물을 대통령에게 바치겠다)'.[25] In addition to Syngman Rhee's bragging about the South Korean government, Kim Taejung recalls Syngman Rhee's propaganda on the unification of Korea with military force (*pukjin muryek thonillon*). He cites this propaganda as the reason why many people asked when North Korean troops entered South Korea whether it meant that Syngman Rhee was carrying out his unification plan.

Thus, when war broke out, the South Korean population thought that it would be finished in a few days with a crushing defeat of the North Korean army. 'It was not only me, who thought so', recollects Kim Taejung, 'everyone believed it'.[26] However, on June 27th, Syngman Rhee was evacuated from Seoul, and on the next day, the city was occupied by the Korean People's Army. Kim Taejung and others were deeply surprised with the sudden turn of events, especially because only a day before Syngman Rhee had appeared on the radio saying that 'whatever happens, Seoul will be desperately defended. I wish people not to worry about it'. Thus, began the period of the bloody civil conflict that has strongly influenced the historical conscience of both North and South Koreans. Kim Taejung wrote:

> Though my family and I were fortunate to survive, the Korean War cut right to the bone 한국전쟁이 뼈에 사무쳐 왔다. Why should we fight? Why should we die? As soon as the balance of forces shifted on the front, a bloodshed between Koreans repeated. If the Communist army retreated, the leftists were killed. If the South Korean army retreated, the rightists were killed. What does ideology mean, I am wondering? For what purpose

> does ideology turn a man into a beast? Is it right to place ideology above the happiness of a nation and a man? I saw a true face of the War. And I became aware what the governing ideology of the Communist Party was. I fully understood that it was the ideology with which we couldn't live. Therefore all my life I lived dreaming about the world free of war and based on reconciliation among Koreans.[27]

When the Korean People's Army occupied the capital, Kim Taejung decided to return to his home town, having walked 400 km from Seoul to Mokpo. On his way to Mokpo, he did not see the national army, but thousands of refugees. 'The bombs were falling on the way that we escaped the war; bullets were flying as if it rained. I was hungry, the road was long, and the death was near', as Kim Taejung recollected his return home in the midst of the Korean War.[28] He was imprisoned by the North Korean People's Army when it occupied Mokpo. He narrowly escaped the death and managed to stay alive, whereas many other prisoners were killed without reason by the North Korean army. Kim Taejung explained his survival by a sudden withdrawal of the Korean People's Army from Mokpo at the end of September 1950. Although some Korean communists remained in the town and could have killed the remaining prisoners, they did not do so because they could have been their relatives. It was not only the Korean communists, the leftists, who killed civilians during the Korean War; the South Korean troops and the rightist groups were also responsible for casualties. Kim Taejung recollects the Kŏch'ang massacre in which the South Korean Army killed hundreds of unarmed citizens between 9–11 February, 1951. According to the latest data, among the victims there were 359 children under 15 years of age, 300 civilians aged between 16 and 60 years, and 60 over the age of 60. The total number of victims was 719.[29] He also remembers the National Defense Corps incident, which resulted in thousands of deaths of South Korean soldiers. Officially, over 90 thousands of soldiers either starved to death or died of disease during their march southwards on the Korean peninsula.[30]

Bruce Cumings, commenting on the atrocities towards civilians and militants during the Korean War, wrote that 'all sides in the war were guilty of atrocities'.[31] The United Nations archive contains many documents, verified by witnesses and relatives, about mass murders of southerners by the northern occupiers. There are mass graves in Chŏnju, Taejŏn, Wŏnju, where thousands of South Koreans were slaughtered by the Korean People's Army. Cumings also gives multiple evidence of South Korean massacres, stating 'In recent years, as South Korea has democratized, investigations have revealed numerous killings of leftists and collaborators with North Korea by the Rhee regime, often hundreds at a time'.[32] The personal hatred of Syngman Rhee to communism has become a great tragedy for South Koreans, many of whom became innocent victims of the large-scale hunting for communists, leftists, and collaborators.

In the midst of war, a political skirmish in Pusan in February of 1952 brought

Syngman Rhee to amend the Constitution to keep him in power. Thus, through violence, torture, and the arrest of political opponents, Syngman Rhee prolonged and strengthened his authoritarian regime. Kim Taejung's observation of the Korean War and the political skirmish in Pusan convinced him to take a more active role in South Korean politics. He recollects:

> Since the earliest time, I have shown an extreme interest in politics. Also, I thought that I had some political talent. But there were two incidents which finally convinced me that I have to do politics. These were the Korean War and the political skirmish in Pusan. Due to the Korean War, I saw how political leaders could lie. The continuous lies of the statesmen ultimately led the country to the crisis and people—to the despair. I understood if a state leader is not honest, the society becomes turbid, and if he deceives his own people, it results in the collapse of the state … The political skirmish in Pusan was another case. On behalf of the people (Syngman Rhee) prolonged his power through violence. Under the guise of people's interests, the authoritarian regime disabled the National Assembly and amended the Constitution as it wished. From this, I concluded that if there is no true democracy, which serves the people, they cannot enjoy the true happiness. It made me believe that if the policy is appropriate to the people's needs, then everything falls into place. Since that time I became involved in politics, opening the way for hardships and heartbreaking events in my life.[33]

Since 1954, when he decided to stand for elections to the National Assembly, and until the end of his life, Kim Taejung was deeply involved in politics. By the time of the outbreak of the April Revolution, he could already witness it through the eyes of a professional politician. In the 1950s, he stood for parliamentary elections three times but failed. However, due to this experience, Kim Taejung developed his political skills and became a recognizable person among opposition-minded politicians of that time. He consistently supported the Democratic Party that was in opposition to the governing Liberal Party. During the presidential campaign of 1960, Kim Taejung worked as a deputy chief of the propaganda department of the Democratic Party in Seoul.

Kim Taejung recalls the development of the political situation in Korea in March–April 1960 in a systematic way. Clearly, he did not personally witness everything that he describes in his autobiography regarding these events. In this sense, Kim Taejung's recollections are more than just an author's memories; this is storytelling, which comprises both a specific author's experience of the past and collective memories. Kim Taejung reflects upon these collective memories in his life narrative by supplementing them with personal comments and assessments of the unfolding political struggle. As in his previous recollections of the past, the core figures of his remembrances are politicians and people, especially Korean students, who played a significant role in the April Revolution. Once again Kim Taejung remembers Syngman Rhee. The author's impressions of Syngman Rhee's resignation are interesting. Kim

Taejung wrote that in spite of the desperate attempts of Syngman Rhee to hold onto his political power, he was clearly weak and too old at his age (85) to control the situation as tightly as he had done before. In his last public speech on radio, Syngman Rhee said that if people wanted him to resign, he would immediately. Commenting on this speech, Kim Taejung wrote that Syngman Rhee apparently did not know (or understand) to what extent the results of his presidential elections were falsified, whereas this falsification is what triggered a series of people's demonstrations in March–April of 1960 and finally led the president's resignation.

No Muhyŏn's oral recollections of the historical events

No Muhyŏn's life narrative starts from the recollections of his childhood. He begins with a postulate that all childhood memories of his friends are similar because they are all about the poverty and misery living conditions of that time. Unlike Yi Myŏngbak's memoirs (president of the Republic of Korea, 2008–2013),[34] which contain the detailed description of his poverty in childhood, No Muhyŏn questions whether it makes sense to tell about the poverty and hardships of his family at that time when everyone was poor? Thus, since the beginning, No Muhyŏn raises the question of what is worth recalling, and what can be silenced. No Muhyŏn's recalls only the most impressive facts of the past. Commenting on the events, he especially emphasizes what he was thinking about or what he was feeling at the moment. It makes an impression as if he were just trying to convey his perceptions of the event, rather than knowledge or personal convictions.

No Muhyŏn was only four years old when the Korean War began. He was too small to remember the war. The April revolution and the May 16 coup are the first historical events about which he had relatively mature memories. Although these memories are very fragmented and scarce in comparison with Kim Taejung's written memories, as mentioned above, they help us to understand how individual memory operates depending on the type of recollections, narrative form, author's standpoint, and social context. No Muhyŏn's family lived in the village, and he often heard how the people of his home village and his friends openly criticized Syngman Rhee and the authoritarian governing of the Liberal Party. If some problems arose people used to explain it by the dictatorship of the Liberal Party. The criticism of the Syngman Rhee's government was apparently widespread among Koreans at the end of the 1950s influencing the children's minds. As No Muhyŏn recalls when a physically strong boy hit the other, and the latter asked him, 'Why are you hitting me?', he answered playfully, 'I am the Liberal Party!'.[35]

In 1960, No Muhyŏn studied in the first grade of the middle school. He remembers that on the eve of Syngman Rhee's birthday (26.03) the students of his school were given a task to write an essay entitled 'Our president Syngman Rhee.' No Muhyŏn

and some other students began to encourage children not to write the essay about Syngman Rhee. As a result, many children did not write it. However, No Muhyŏn himself wrote the essay deliberately making a spelling error in the word 'president.' Soon after, he was called to the school administration. The chief of staff and another administrator asked him, 'How could you write like this?' No Muhyŏn sincerely answered that he had heard much criticism of Syngman Rhee from his older brother and the villagers who called the president a dictator. The chief of staff was deeply shocked by No Muhyŏn's answer and punished him, forcing him to sit on his knees for hours. When he was sitting at the administration office, his school director and the others read in the newspaper about the death of Cho Byŏngok, a main political rival of Syngman Rhee in the presidential campaign of 1960. Obviously, the director was happy to know that Cho Byŏngok died before the presidential elections because commenting on his death he called Syngman Rhee a lucky man, who was sent to Koreans by God. When No Muhyŏn saw how the director reacted to the death of Cho Byŏngok, he decided not to wait when he would get permission to go home. Under the pretext that he wanted to the toilet, No Muhyŏn came out of the administration office and went home without permission.

Soon after the April revolution, his school director—during a lesson on morality—unexpectedly wrote on the desk a slogan in English, 'the government of the people, by the people, for the people.' No Muhyŏn was deeply impressed by the director's criticism of the political regime because before he had always praised President Syngman Rhee. Moreover, No Muhyŏn personally saw how a few weeks before the director was happy to know about the death of Cho Byŏngok that meant Syngman Rhee's upcoming victory in the presidential elections. The most children did not understand what the director's words, taken from the Gettysburg Address of US President Abraham Lincoln, meant. However, No Muhyŏn wrote down the slogan and learned it by heart. At that moment he thought that the April revolution had greatly influenced the director's mind making him completely change his views on the Syngman Rhee's regime. No Muhyŏn stressed in his memoir that this impression stayed with him long after it had happened. I think that this incident made him believe in the capacity of democracy to influence people's mind and behavior choices.

No Muhyŏn's recollections of the April revolution mainly contain his impressions of what he witnessed at school or on the street. For example, he tells how he saw trucks full of men with white bandages on their heads and sticks in their hands, who moved from Pusan to Masan. He also mentions how he learned about the ongoing political events from his friends, the press, and radio. No Muhyŏn recalls that in the midst of the April revolution the high school students gathered all the students of the middle school on the stadium and after strike announcement ordered them to go home. During the strike, students did not attend the classes. Although No Muhyŏn did not clarify in his memoir how long the strike lasted, it is interesting that he mentioned

it. It means that indirectly he also took part in the student's protests during the April revolution.

When remembering the May 16 coup, No Muhyŏn tells us a story about the destruction of a mass grave containing the remains of the massacre victims during the Korean War. He says that soon after the April Revolution, the people of his home village dug out those remains to try to find their relatives. However, only some of the remains were identified by the villagers, whereas the unrecognizable others were grouped together and buried in a mass grave. No Muhyŏn recalls that after the May 16 coup someone was ordered to destroy the mass grave and liquidate all the remains. He did not understand at the time why they decided to destroy the mass grave, but this accident made a deep impression on him. Clearly, the Park Chung-hee [Pak Chŏnghŭi] government wanted to get rid of this negative experience of the past in the collective memory, which would be constantly recreated in the people's minds if the mass grave was left untouched. Summing up his recollections of the May 16 coup, No Muhyŏn says that whatever we think about President Park Chung-hee, it is impossible to evaluate him positively.[36]

Commenting on the socio-political changes that happened in South Korea due to democratization, No Muhyŏn says:

> The world has changed, but it has changed strangely. If under the military regime the government had the power to take away someone's property, today the government has no authority to return the stolen property to its owners. We have invested all our efforts in the democratization of the political regime but left unresolved the issues of the historical past. As a result, people in power, especially those who unfairly gained the power, are enjoying the benefits of democracy. Although it is unfair, I think that it testifies to the limitation of our history (우리 역사의 한계라고 생각합니다). We can not bring justice not only to those who were affected by Chung-Soo Scholarship Foundation[37] but to many others who seriously suffered through vicissitudes of the past. So sometimes I say that 'history cannot be reversed" (역사는 물릴 수 없는 것).[38] No Muhyŏn raises two important questions: first, to what extent do Koreans need to understand the past, and, second, should they just reconcile with the past if it is impossible to reverse the history and to restore justice to the victims of the authoritarian regime in due measure?

As can be seen, No Muhyŏn was very discursive and self-questioning in his oral recollections. However, he poses these questions not only to himself but also to potential listener or reader of his remembrances. Thus, he regularly engages the reader in discussions over those issues of the past that he himself finds very important. In this regard, No Muhyŏn's recollections are not typical of a life narrative because he focused on the political problems of Korea to such an extent that even his own experiences of the past were also viewed through these problems. He primarily recalled those events that he wanted the Korean people to remember. At the end of the chapter devoted to his remembrances of the May 16 coup, No Muhyŏn quotes the

words of the German president, Johannes Rau (1999–2004), who said that Germany should never forget the atrocities of Hitler's government. No Muhyŏn, echoing this call, rhetorically asks why Koreans so easily forget the May 16 coup? The answer is evident—people have to remember it forever so as to never repeat what it finally led in South Korean history.

Concluding his memoirs, No Muhyŏn explains why he decided to come back to his home village after the end of the presidential term. As a rule, South Korean presidents stay in Seoul after retirement. No Muhyŏn says that throughout his presidency he has tried to implement equal opportunities policy, which also implied the equal development of city and country region. His decision to move to the countryside was to emphasize his continuous commitment to this policy.[39] Factually, No Muhyŏn wanted to set an example for future Korean political leaders so that they would remain faithful to the declared course not only in words but also in deeds. He believed that consistent adherence to the declared principles is an important quality of the political leader. In his memoirs, No Muhyŏn especially stresses the importance of moral principles and values in political behavior. For example, explaining reasons for the success of the June Democratic Uprising in 1987, he says that it was successful because both the people and politicians were guided by the ideals of democracy and justice.

> Sometimes politicians should firmly follow the political course which appeals rather to values than to the current interests of the people. Although this course will not necessarily be successful, it will allow politicians to meet the people who are susceptible to the history based on values. Thus they can be strong. However, most of our politicians did not behave like this.[40]

Concluding remarks

As I mentioned above, to determine how historical events are recollected by individual memories in an autobiographical writing, it is important to understand the author's standpoint at which he reviews his life and to know the individual conditions surrounding an autobiographer when he writes his memoir. On these bases, Kim Taejung and No Muhyŏn's autobiographical writings should be classified as political memoirs, because both authors focus mainly on political events rather than on stories of their private lives. Moreover, both authors tend to evaluate both their lives and the past primarily through political events. Apparently, they were so involved in politics that could not imagine their lives outside of it. It means that Kim Taejung's and No Muhyŏn's autobiographical writings were also politically motivated. Kim Taejung's autobiography is his last message to the Korean people and future political leaders. Throughout his memories, he remains very discursive and instructive. In one of his

early books, 'A New Beginning: A Collection of Essays',[41] Kim Taejung wrote that his life was full of hardships through which he had lost his first wife, many friends, and all his estate. But if it had not happened, he added, he would not have moral rights to instruct his reader. From the same standpoint, Kim Taejung addresses to the reader in his autobiography. He does not hesitate to inculcate the Korean people with a certain morality because he believes that he has suffered the right to educate the others.

For No Muhyŏn, his memoir was a way to show once again the Korean people who he was as a person and a politician, and what he has done as he saw it himself. Unlike Kim Taejung, whose political career started under the regime of Syngman Rhee, No Muhyŏn became involved in politics at the end of the 1970s—early 1980s. His way to the presidency was less complicated than the Kim Taejung's one. Although it is hard to judge who of them suffered more from politics, taking into consideration No Muhyŏn's suicide, it seems evident that they experienced different hardships. Moreover, they belonged to different types of political leaders. If Kim Taejung was a leader who, conditionally speaking, teaches how to govern, No Muhyŏn was a leader, who raises a question of how best to govern. For this reason, No Muhyŏn's oral recollections are very discursive and philosophical. He often raises questions on the development of South Korea but does not give a clear answer, leaving the reader to think of the answer.

The political events of the modern South Korean history are the main subject of Kim Taejung and No Muhyŏn's recollections. By continuous comments on the unfolding political conflicts and rhetorical questioning throughout their life narratives the authors regularly contest the official historical discourse, which for decades remained silent about the painful facts of South Korean history. Kim Taejung and No Muhyŏn do not hesitate to tell about the atrocities and injustice of the Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee's governments towards its own people. Kim Taejung recollections of the Jeju uprising and the Korean War testify to the complexity of these conflicts which cannot be unambiguously interpreted. However, throughout the authoritarian regimes, the memory policy was aimed to reduce the diversity of recollections and to homogenize representations of the past. As a result, the government could form a unilateral view of the past based on numerous misconceptions. Although due to democratization the memory policy has changed becoming more susceptive to the issue of restoring historical injustice, the past atrocities and human rights violations of the authoritarian regime are still a subject of heated debates in South Korean society. It means that in spite of the political liberalization at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s the collective memory policy has not been completely reviewed, thus retaining some of the misconceptions of the past.

Kim Taejung and No Muhyŏn's evaluations of the liberation period, the Korean War, the April revolution and the May 16 coup mainly correspond to the

assessments of these historical events of the various governmental committees for restoring historical truth. I mean the National Committee for investigation of the truth about the Jeju April 3 Incident (*jeju 4.3 sageon jinsanggyumyeong mit huisaengja myeongyehoebogwiwonhoe*/제주 4.3사건 진상규명 및 희생자 명예회복위원회), Truth and Reconciliation Commission (*jejinsil•hwahaereul wihan gwageosa jeongri wiwonhoe*/진실·화해를 위한 과거사 정리 위원회), the National Committee for investigation of the pro-Japanese and anti-national activities (*daehanminguk chinilbanminjokhaengwijinsanggyumyeongwiwonhoe*/대한민국 친일반민족행위진상규명위원회) that were established in the 2000s. Through the activities of these committees, many Koreans could see the past without embellishment, but not all of them reacted to their findings adequately. I think this is one of the reasons why No Muhyŏn remains thoughtful throughout his memoirs. He understands that Korean society is deeply divided on the issue of the historical past. Not all people can resist the contemplation of collective memory, which itself had been formed by the experience of authoritarian government for decades. Even after the disappearance of the authoritarianism, that memory has not been completely revised.

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35. Muhyŏn No, *Success and Frustration* (*seonggonggwa jwajeol*/성공과 좌절) (Seoul: Hakkojae Publishing Comp., 2009), 116.
36. Ibid., 120–123.
37. The name of the Foundation derives from two names—Chung-hee (Park Chung-hee) and Young-su (Yuk Yŏngsu, Park Chung-hee's second wife). In 1958, one of the richest entrepreneur of Pusan, Kim Jeetae established Puil Scholarship Foundation (釜日奬學會). After the May 16 coup, following a rigged trial Kim Jeetae was sentenced to 7 years in prison, and the Foundation property was transferred to the state. On the base of Puil Scholarship Foundation Park Chung-hee established his own Foundation, May 16th Foundation, later renamed to Chung-Su Scholarship Foundation. In 1995–2005, Pak Kŭnhye served as its chairman. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/212699.html.
38. Ibid., 125.
39. Ibid., 163.
40. Ibid., 158.
41. Taejung Kim, *The Autobiography* (*gimdaejung jaseojeon*/김대중 자서전), Vol. 1–2 (Seoul: Samin Publishing Comp., 2010), 235.

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SOCIO-RELIGIOUS VOLUNTEERISM: THE AUSTRALIAN NGO MOVEMENT DURING THE KOREAN WAR (1950–1953)

David W. Kim

Visiting Fellow of the Australian National University, Department of Political and Social Change, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs

David (PhD, Syd) is a visiting fellow at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University. He previously did postdoctoral research at the University of Edinburgh (UK) and Seoul National University, South Korea, and lectured at Charles Stuart University in Sydney, Australia after receiving a PhD (History) from the University of Sydney.

He has written five books and over twenty-five articles including *New Religious Movements in Modern Asian History: Socio-Cultural Alternatives* (Brill, 2018 forthcoming), *Colonial Transformation and Asian Religions in Modern History* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018), *Religious Encounters in Transcultural Society* (Lexington, 2017), *Religious Transformation in Modern Asia: A Transnational Movement* (Brill, 2015), 'Daesoonjinrihoe in Korean New Religious Movements' (2014) and several book reviews for the Irish Journal of Asian Studies and the Journal of Religious History and Theology in Scotland.

Abstract

The Korean peninsula, like Taiwan (1895–1945), was one of Japan's colonies in the first half of the twentieth century (1910–1945). The end of World War II brought an opportunity to be independent, but the different ideologies of the Capitalist Bloc and the Soviet Bloc generated the Cold War. The Korean War (1950–1953) was the initial result of the political conflict. Australia did not have diplomatic relations with the unsteady nation until 1963, but the involvement of the Australian government cannot be disregarded. The Liberal government, led by Prime Minister Robert Menzies, immediately responded to the UN resolution (June 25, 1950) by offering military assistance. Was this military support the only aid for Korea? If not, how did Australia affect citizens of the war zone? Was there an Australian NGO movement? If so, what

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did these NGO's do? This paper not only explores the social activities of the group of Australian NGO's, but also argues that the religious volunteerism of humanitarian aid, medical work, religious mission, and education was a significant refugee project in Pusan (the temporary capital of the Republic of Korea during the Korean War) and Kyŏngnam province.

Key words: Korean War, Australian NGO, Volunteerism, POW, Pusan.

SOCIO-RELIGIOUS VOLUNTEERISM: THE AUSTRALIAN NGO MOVEMENT DURING THE KOREAN WAR (1950–1953)

David W. Kim

When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPS: 1925–1960) began to reconsider the Korean colonial policy of Japan for which the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) was one of the eleven national councils in the pre-UN international organization (IPS), along with the USA, Canada, China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, NZ, the Philippines, the UK, and the USSR.[1] As Japan was defeated, the Korean peninsula was ideologically divided into North and South Koreas in 1945. The North was occupied by troops of the Soviet Union. The South was superintended by the United States. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK: 1947–1948) was the body that oversaw elections in May 1948. The Commission consisted of nine nations, including Australia, Canada, and Syria.[2] Afterwards, Australia played an ongoing, significant role as a member of the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), which was established in 1948 as a diplomatic mission to monitor the withdrawal of WWII occupation forces from Korea, and provided UN intelligence sources for the unification of the two regimes.[3]

When the troops of North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25 1950, the United Nations Security Council adopted *Resolution 82*, calling on North Korea to cease hostilities and withdraw to the 38th parallel.[4] The United Nations Command (UNC) formed the multinational military forces supporting South Korea during the Korean War. Personnel from the Australian Army (3 RAR, and elements of 1 and 2 RAR), the Royal Australian Air Force (No. 77 Squadron, and other elements), and the Royal Australian Navy (nine ships, including HMS *Glory* and HMAS *Sydney*, and an air group) fought as part of the UN multinational force.[5] Australia dispatched seventeen thousand service people during the Korean War from 1950 to 1953.[6]

Among them, the military commitment of Australian females was evident. In this situation where there was a severe manpower shortage, a new Australian women's air force was formed in July 1950 and became the Women's Royal Australian Air Force (WRAAF). The Royal Australian Army Nursing Corps (RAANC) was also established, in February 1951, from the Royal Australian Army Nursing Service (RAANS).[7] Enlistment for the Women's Royal Australian Army Corps (WRAAC)

Figure 1. RAANC Nurses in Korea

began in April 1951, along with enlistment for the Women's Royal Australian Naval Service (WRANS).[8] Then, was there any involvement of Australian NGO people during the Korean War? If so, what was their background? Where were they? What was their concern, and how did they help the Korean people?

Australian NGO Volunteerism in Pusan and Kyŏngnam Province

The sociocultural activities of the Australian non-government organisations (NGOs) were not the result of the direct involvement of the Australian movement in the Asia-Pacific policy in the 1940s. Rather, the history of the Australian NGO movement came about following the death of Joseph Henry Davies in Pusan (a harbour city in the southern part of Korea) in 1889.[9] From 1889 to 1941, there were seventy-eight Australian male and female volunteers, helping the citizens of colonial Korea for fifty years.[10] The deportation order of Japan caused all foreigners, including Australians, to be forcefully deported in 1941. Afterwards, Korea were subjected to socio-political persecution during the Greater East Asia War (until 1945). The Korean people experienced independence at the conclusion of the war, but the period between 1945 and 1950 was another confused time under foreign military forces.

The voluntary activities of Australians were slight, but the Korean War motivated the hearts of Australians through the Presbyterian Church of Australia (PCA) and the Presbyterian Women's Missionary Union (PWMU). Kim Hyŏngsu demonstrated the

role of the World Council of Churches (WCC) with a pro-South Korea, pro-American, and pro-UN position on the Korea War. The WCC also approved 'the police action' of the United Nations. The leaders of the American Churches held a meeting in New York in October 1950, to discuss relief work in Korea. In this regard, Kim Hyŏngsu argued that Korea should become 'the primary recipient of American paternalism' in East Asia, instead of China and Japan.[11] However, since the regions of Pusan and Kyŏngnam province had been the main areas in which Australian volunteers had previously settled, from the first half of the twentieth century, the launch of social volunteerism among Australian NGO people was much easier and more effective. When the capital of South Korea was relocated twice from Seoul to Pusan, in 1950 and 1951–53, war refugees gathered in the provisional capital city.[12] The Australian Mission base was the main place where the foreign NGO workers could get help or cooperate together to assist Korean refugees. The compassionate spirit of Australian volunteerism was revealed in the progressive works of humanitarian relief, medical work, religious mission, and education.

Humanitarian Relief

During the Korean War, the Australian military groups provided defence against the communists of North Korea and China as part of the UN force. On the other hand, members of Australian NGOs launched humanitarian relief work, for tens of thousands of refugees had fled from Seoul and North Korea: 'Visited a refugee camp of about 1,000 this morning on a river bed … another camp of one half million people in the river bed … the Korean military hospital in Pusan needs more doctors, nurses, bandages … water, toilet facilities, blankets and organisation are the major needs.'[13] Harold Voelkel expressed the chaotic situation when he said: 'Pusan seems to be absorbing all Korea. People from all places stream in, Pusan became definitely the hub of the nation.'[14] There were a few international NGOs in Pusan, such as the Independent Board, Australian Presbyterian, Southern Presbyterian, Methodists, Seventh Day Adventists, the YMCA,[15] and international chaplains, but 'the Australian House' became the international center where all NGO groups regularly met for their cooperative works: 'the Australian House is like an accordion, for when any one extra arrives they apparently just move over and let him in.'[16]

In response, the Presbyterian Church of Australia's (PCA) Board of Mission (Sydney) contributed £500 to re-establish the homes and properties in a part of south Kyŏngsang province.[17] Harold W. Lane delivered thirty-seven bags of grain to a district where half a million refugees were living out in the open space.[18] The Australian relief worker visited the cities and towns of Masan, Chudong, Sinmasan, Chindong, Pansung, Ch'angwŏn, Hamyang, Haman, and Chinju with relief supplies by December 31 1950. In particular, Chinju, where there had been the major

Australian Hospital (the Paton Memorial Hospital) from 1905, was completely destroyed between June and August 1950.[19] The Chinju railway station, with the bridge between Masan and Chinju, was broken. The city was seen to be hopelessly without a water service, electric light, and trains. The Southern Presbyterians left 1,700,000 won to the Australian NGO for Korean refugees (January 15 1951). The Queensland PCA gave more than £800 for the re-habitation of Pusan and Kyŏngnam province in March 1951.[20] Some twenty boxes of clothes, donated by a New Zealand chaplain, were provided for the regions with refugees.[21] These sources were a great help toward overcoming the first winter (December 1950 to February 1951). While the World Council of Churches Food Bowl Appeal (WCCFBA) contributed £1,295, the PWMU and other Australian bodies added £700 toward relief in September 1951.[22]

The relief clothing sent from Australia had been widely distributed throughout regions of south Kyŏngsang before the second winter of the Korean War. Mr Lane testified that a three-quarter ton truck from the United Church of Canada (UCC) had made a number of trips to the country with relief supplies. Thousands of people related to 150 regional churches received supplies. The houses in the remote towns and villages also obtained this relief benefit.[23] The leaders of regional churches supported families, women, and children who had lost family members and who were not being reached by the relief activity of the Korean government. There were also individuals who came to the Australian House looking for help. Those refugees were sent back to their dwelling places with food and clothes. Korean Army chaplains also helped to distribute twenty boxes of clothes for the destitute people just south of the 38th parallel.[24] A big proportion of the relief supplies sent from Australia were for the lepers who used to be under the care of the pre-1940 Australian volunteers in the Gamman-dong district of Pusan. Relief funds had also enabled Australian workers to help not only the families of religious leaders, but also a seven-year old boy whose eyes were injured.[25]

Among other narratives of relief work, a widow, with four children, was given some money to start as a wayside seller of fruits. The result being successful, this approach was applied to similar cases of refugee people who wanted to be self-sufficient, even during the wartime. The idea of 'self-help' was properly established as the Australian Relief Committee organized 'small workshops where women may be able to make things for themselves and thus earn a little, rather than being on the dole.'[26] The Australian House was in charge of distributing the New Zealand Church's (NZC) £9,000 for Korean Christians and their churches that were destroyed.[27] Twenty-five cases of relief goods had been delivered in Pusan in the middle of 1952, while it was decided that the special consignment of twenty-two cases from Sydney was to be supplied to Korean residents in Japan.[28] A ton of Australian powdered milk was

imported from Hong Kong for hospitals which indirectly challenged the other foreign government agencies to bring in larger quantities.[29]

Thus, the Australian NGO group focused mainly on humanitarian relief from the end of 1950 to the early part of 1952, when there were so many refugees in Pusan and its regions of Kyŏngnam province. Yet, Elizabeth Dunn, who was an eyewitness of the Korean War, argued that there was further need of relief: 'their very existence depends on the love and pity and help from others which will make a difference between life and death.'[30] Under such a circumstance, the change of currency on July 17 1952 increased the financial burden of Australian workers in that 'the USA dollar brought 24,000 won, but now it can bring only 6,000 won.'[31]

Il-Sin Medical Project

Medical volunteerism was another social method by which the Australian NGO people impacted the war refugees. Although they did not have any medical volunteers between 1941 and 1950, the Korean War demanded medical need and encouraged the return of two daughters of James Mackenzie, who was called the father of Korean lepers during the colonial era (1910–1940). When the Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong declared the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1 1949, Dr Helen and midwife Catherine 'Cath' Mackenzie had to leave China. When the initial campaign of supplying relief was turning into a second round, the medical volunteers 'offered themselves for service in Korea in view of the great urgency of the relief programme.'[32] Yet, the war situation did not allow them to entry to the Korean peninsula until June 19 1951, on which date the General PWMU Committee proposed the service plan for the Save the Children Fund organisation.[33] The arrival of Helen and Cath in Pusan, where they were born and had grown up, was the second step of the Australian NGOs launching a health project, especially for the social minorities of women and children.[34]

The first glimpse of Pusan for the female workers showed the growth of population, caused by the arrival of people from Seoul and North.[35] A letter from Helen and Cath proved that the medical work was launched after a period of preparation: 'it is now possible to send parcels, up to 11 lbs. in weight, to Korea … the need is for babies' clothes and all that a baby needs, like soap, powder, napkins, etc. also pyjamas and nightgowns for the mothers.'[36] The passion of the medical volunteers was overwhelming, but the social situation was not ready to launch until June 1952; nevertheless, they regularly visited the other temporary medical institutions of the Korean government and international organisation (UNCACK: United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea).[37] *The Strange Korea of Today* testified that the condition of those places was horrible as patients received no nursing assistance.[38] The family was responsible for administering to patients. There were not enough

〈1946.5〉
김성여 목사의 본 교회 취임 기념으로 당회원과 함께

〈1952〉
일신부인병원이 개원 준비를 하고 있는 일신유치원

Figure 2. The Pusanchin church people and the building of a new maternity hospital

blankets, while hygiene in the medical camps was the main concern. It was a reality that injections were overused or abused. The role of nurses was simply to wait on the doctors and write charts.[39] Helen argued that the lack of nursing was partly due to the Japanese medical system under which the Koreans had been trained.[40] There were not also enough medical books for training local students. *A Glimpse of Ravaged Korea* demonstrated that Severance Hospital was in the same situation, where refugee women and children were mainly treated under a lack of facilities. Patients, including infants, were not properly cared for. They needed specialists qualified in Pathology, Obstetrics, Gynaecology, Surgery, and Medicine.[41] The Australian medical workers helped to bring about a new beginning for Severance Hospital as well as Ewha Women's Christian University Medical School in Pusan. Yet, such insecurity in the wartime Korean society instigated a daily number of suicides (600 people per day).[42]

Therefore, the purpose of the Australian hospital was to focus on women and children. The Governor of the province supported the medical project.[43] The authorities of the United Nations and the Korean Church were also approached for consultation. As a result, the medical organisation was formed as an obstetric hospital as well as training nurse-midwives.[44] For this project, Dr Helen Mackenzie and Catharine Mackenzie were specially trained and qualified with previous experiences in China. The Victorian PWMU donated £10,000, while the Canadian Mission was invited to share their business management skills in the enterprise.[45] The Korean medical team was to employ three doctors and thirty nurses. The budget of £12,000 was confirmed, with the additional cost of resources (£2,000).[46] Many baby items were required, such as nighties, singlets, jackets, napkins, blankets, and bunny rugs. Knitted clothes were not recommended for hospital use. Women's clothes, safety pins, powders, soap, olive oil, wool, gauze, linen, and bed jackets were demanded in

unlimited quantities. Table-covers, cups, little dishes, mugs, curtains, screens, paint, enamel, and stain were also suggested as being needed for the new Pusan obstetric hospital. Drugs, hospital goods, vitamins, iron, aspirin, Dettol and other disinfectants (like sulphas) were required as well.[47]

In the second half of 1952, the Australian House had become the owner of the hospital property. Helen and Catherine, who had experience in making a temple into a hospital in China, began the project to change a Pusanchin church's kindergarten building into a hospital, which could house fourteen beds. The medical books also began to arrive from Australia, for training purposes. Some of the resources were contributed to Severance Hospital and the Ewha (medical) library.[48] The hospital was officially opened on September 17 1952, and named 'Il-Sin Women's Hospital' which means 'daily new,' with the idea of renewal every day. The United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) supported the extra building (kitchen, laundry, staff dining-room, and out-patient quarters) the hospital needed and gave $500 for teaching equipment.[49] The hospital averaged two babies a day in February 1953.[50] The 'infant care,'[51] which previously brought great success at the Australian Chinju Hospital (Paton Memorial) during the colonial period of Korea, was one of the main works in the hospital. There was a plan for a postgraduate course for those who had no chance for practical experience during their training. Another programme was to offer six months of training for student nurses of other NGO hospitals, to be devoted to midwifery. The home-delivery service was additionally launched by nurses who had sufficient experience, because most Korean women preferred to have their babies at home.[52]

Religious Mission

Zainichi Koreans[53]

The Australian NGO volunteers not only affected the refugee society with medical technology, but also continued their religious mission among Koreans. When the Korean War occurred in June 1950, most of the foreign residents had to leave Korea without any certainty of return.[54] The Australian volunteers moved to Japan, where there were Korean immigrants from Chŏlla Province, Kuchang, Daegu, Andong, Kimchun, and Cheju.[55] Australians exiled in Japan cooperated with the Yokohama Korean Christian community to help the war refugees. The church was set up in the Korean style as a room in a Japanese house. The original church was completely destroyed at the end of the Second World War. Yet, according to Miss Dunn, Sunday school was a great place where thirty to forty children gathered, even though all teaching had to be done in the Japanese language. Reading and writing in Korean script was offered at the end of the Sunday programme.[56]

As Miss M. Withers and Miss A.A. McNabb serviced the Tokyo Korean Church, there were two other Korean settlements. The Keio-Tamagawa district of Tokyo had over 100 Korean houses. The adult service and Sunday school were held at a house for children and women. As a result, Tamagawa Korean Christians had a site for a small church, towards which the Tokyo Korean Church, Australian Mission (£25), Canadian Mission, and the Koreans in the district helped with contributions.[57] There were another fifty to sixty houses in the area of Kami-ishihara, in which the church had twenty-one people regularly attending service.[58] There was an objection from three fortune tellers to prevent Korean people coming to the church, but the Australian pastoral team still influenced the Zainichi Koreans in Japan from early 1951. By the summer of 1952, Miss Withers confessed that 'the (voluntary) work in Japan among children is growing numerically and in enthusiasm.'[59] The former Korean students then took over the English Bible Study classes: 'Letters from some of the students at the high school where I (McNabb) taught report that the missionary who said I had taught is now taking all four and the after-school Bible class …'; 'Our Bible class is being run as well as when you (McNabb) were here.'[60]

The Korean Church in Kyŏngnam Province

The Korean War also brought a time of suffering for the Korean Church. Many Christians perished and hundreds of church buildings were lost. Most churches became greatly impoverished. F. Kinsler reported, on February 15 1951, that many Christian ministers were killed or missing: 246 Presbyterians, eighty Roman Catholics, fifty-five Methodists, six Anglicans, six Holiness Church ministers, four members of the Salvation Army, thirty-two foreign missionaries, and seven youth workers.[61] While the Christians of Australia had been asked to help the rehabilitation, the churches in Pusan, including Sin Yang Church, were generously housing many refugee people. Permission for other Australians to enter had been refused, but Rev H.W. Lane, with his Korean colleague An Umjun, consistently supported the local churches in the region from 1950–1951.[62] He regularly visited the (150) churches of Kyŏngnam region, including Chinju, Masan, Haman, and Kuchang, to encourage and cooperate with the local pastors for the members as well as war casualties:[63]

> We went to Chinhai to Yaksin Lee's place … did not see Yaksin's sister … His boy is a bright young lad and the girls [are] growing into nice young ladies. The orphanage children look well cared for … we saw Dr Lee (a former doctor at Australian Chinju hospital in the 1930s). He looked ill. Yaksin Lee came to Pusan with us.[64]

The church in the Haman region was destroyed along with almost every house. However, the congregation bravely began to rebuild the church, for which Australian restoration funds were donated.[65] Helen Mackenzie testified to the religious passion of Korean Christians through the example of a Pusan Easter Sunday, saying: 'Today



1952년에 건축한 부산진교회
(설계,시공 : 건축가 김칠봉 장로)

〈1956〉
초대 권사 임직
(김순남,양봉옥,정시안)

Figure 3. The Pusanchin church and ordination of leadership

is Easter Sunday and at dawn 5,000 Koreans and UN soldiers gathered to worship the Risen Lord.'[66] The Australian volunteer witnessed the faithfulness of Korean churches at early morning prayer. Meanwhile, Rev. George Anderson, who had previously volunteered in Korea from 1922 to 1934, had been appointed Foreign Mission Secretary of the Presbyterian Church of Australia in 1939. During his tenure he visited Korea a few times, including the years of 1939, 1943, 1946–7, and 1949. When the Korean War occurred, he resigned from his position and then volunteered to help the Korean people again. Anderson returned to Korea in March 1952.[67]

His ministry was visiting small churches to share the good news of Christianity. The Korean Church was eager to be encouraged by the preacher: 'It's putting a lot on you but will you speak to us again at the daybreak prayer meeting?'[68] The D.M. Lyall Memorial School, which was established by Australians in 1926, was operated by the Korean Church. The ministry of George Anderson reached out to the (900) boys of the school. The Bible Women worked closely with the pastoral leadership of the Australian leader. They were not offered proper training, but their role was significant in the local Korean churches. Despite their commitment, the prayer of Anderson was for the need of 'efficient and devoted ministers, efficient and devoted Bible women, efficient and devoted ordinary members of the congregations.'[69] The idea of establishing a District Training Bible Institute was eventually suggested for 'young and old' and 'men and women.' The so-called 'Higher Bible Institute in Pusan' began to function as a professional religious organisation, where candidates from Bible women, home missionaries, and ministers were admitted. At the request of the Australian Mission it included professional teachers from Australia.[70]

Chaplaincy and POWs

From January to June 1951, the fighting between North and South Korea occurred around the 38th parallel. The opposing sides, with the support of Chinese communists and the United Nations, were taut for about six months. Then, a military stalemate was maintained from July 1951 to July 1953. During the period in which the refugee situation was gradually steadying, the military mission was another aspect in which Australian (and Korean) volunteers were concerned in the southern part of South Korea. As part of the military mission, a Chaplains Corps was established in the Korean Army with the support of President Syngman Rhee [Ri Sŭngman] and the Defence Minister. No national funds were available for chaplains. Christian solders made up less than five per cent of the Korean Army. The rest of the Korean soldiers were animists, and a few Buddhists. However, David Chung who was teaching at the Chosen Seminary, was appointed as a 'teacher' among military men. The chaplain then organised an ultimate group of four teachers. Soon after, thirty-two civilian chaplains (ten Presbyterians; nine Methodists; four of the Holiness Church, and nine Catholics), under the guidance of united foreign volunteers, committed to the military chaplaincy of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Divisions.[71] There was a negative concern for a civilian chaplaincy in the Army, but the result, according to the report of military chaplain W.E. Shaw, was unexpectedly positive, in that Korean (civilian) chaplains were 'eager to serve their soldiers and seize the tremendous evangelistic opportunity' among the non-Christians.[72] The number of Korean chaplains was increased to 100 (including forty Korean Presbyterian chaplains) in June 1952.[73] Their clothes, food, scriptures, hymnals, and other supplies were supplied by the international Chaplain Corps. The visitation of Chaplain-General Stewart to Korea additionally promoted the necessity and significance of chaplaincy in the Korea Army.

Since there were many prisoners (135,000) in Pusan and surrounding regions, including Kŏjedo ('Island of Great Salvation'),[74] the POW (prisoners of war) mission was an extension of the Christian mission. The chaplain, Harold Voelkel visited the POW camp on one occasion when there were 1,000 to 1,500 teenagers (between fourteen and sixteen years old).[75] On another occasion he met 2,000 communicants at a POW church. Voelkel had 237 baptisms and 573 catechumens in April 1952. The Bible correspondence course was offered for the Christian POWs. Three hundred and sixteen POWs took the exams, and a total of 257 graduated.[76] As the Rev W.C. Kerr worked among the tens of thousands of Korean POWs, the Australian religious leader, as an officer of the United Nations, gave instruction on the basic principles of democracy as well as the Bible. Since most of them came from North Korea, the new religious teaching was more than welcome among the Communist soldiers.[77] By December 1952, thousands of prisoners came out to Church services, day-break prayer meetings, and Bible study. The female POWs were another concern

of Australian volunteers, and the Korean Church conducted such meetings among orphans, hospitals, and refugees.[78] The experience of Rene Watkins testifies that the refugee church in Kŏjedo, made with flimsy deal boards, had a congregation of about 100. Yet, their spirit of worship was very sincere, reaching down to the depths of a very real faith.[79]

Modern Education

The social activity of modern education was the last strategy that the Australian workers applied, because, unlike male professionals and female medical workers, female foreigners were not allowed to enter the Korean peninsula. Helen and Catharine Mackenzie, as medical experts, arrived in Korea in March 1952, but non-medical females had to wait until September 1952.[80] When the Korean War had settled down, one year before its end, there were chances for Misses M. Withers, A.A. McNabb and Rene Watkins to return.

Korean Education in Pusan

Since the educational relationship of Australia with Korea had been established from the pre-colonial period of the early twentieth century,[81] it was not a surprise that NGO Australians were involved in local education in Pusan and its surrounding regions. The first task was to rehabilitate the Pusanchin kindergarten that had been launched in 1895 by Australians, including Bessie Moore (1863–1956), Belle Menzies (1856–1935), and Agnes Brown (1868–1954). The Korean teachers (including Miss Chai) and the members of the Mothers' Association co-operated in the establishment of the project, even though all the equipment had been destroyed except for a piano and two organs. They had to use the ground floor of the Pusanchin church.[82] Miss Dunn described the historical narrative whereby, 'these children are being educated, although there are no schools. They (teachers) are meeting with the children on the hill-sides, or in bombed-out sites.'[83] Miss Watkins planned to teach some handicrafts to the patients of a public hospital. Her letter testified to her passion for helping Korean people: 'I wonder if you could obtain a gramophone. You may have heard of our visit to a public T.B. hospital here (Pusan). There are sixty patients, all of them lying all day with nothing to do and no one visiting them at all.'[84] The education of the war orphans was also part of their social project.

The Sunday school that was launched, from April 1951, was part of the educational volunteerism. Miss McNabb once witnessed that at 9: 30am, children met in a small space with very few teachers, but they certainly learnt the Bible stories, which touched some of them.[85] Initiating a sewing project for widows was encouraged in the region of Masan (a population of 80,000). They provided sewing machines to the

widows to support their family and children. It is also a common phenomenon for Australian volunteers to adopt homeless children, allowing the children the chance to become educated. Catharine Mackenzie, like other colleagues, adopted one child, Induri, who had been abandoned.[86] The so-called 'House of Hope' had been built to provide a home for women coming out of prison. The place functioned to offer a Christian welcome and a guide in the process of rehabilitation.[87] By the end of 1953, the educational work of Australian women was extended to the T'ongyŏng and Chinju regions after Masan.[88] As a result, Queeaimie (known as Harla or Hanna), who attended Ilsin Girls' School (one of the first Australian schools), affected the life of a brother (Yang Sung Bong) as he became the Mayor of Pusan and Minister of Agriculture in President Rhee's cabinet. Her sister-in-law (Mr Yang's wife: Moon Pokseerie) was also educated in the initial Australian educational centre (called Myoora Institute) and went through Ilsin Girls' School.[89] The female pastor Kong Dŏkkwi (1911–1997) of T'ongyŏng, who was graduated from the Australian Jin-Myoung kindergarten and Ilsin Girls' School, became the wife of the fourth President of South Korea, Yun Posŏn (1960–1962). The First Lady (Son Myŏngsun) of the seventh President of South Korea, Kim Yŏngsam (1993–1998), was also influenced by one of the Australian education centres (Changsin School) in Masan.

Korean Education in Australia

Modern education for Koreans was not only practiced in Korea, but also in Australia in the 1950s. The professional fields were unlimited, including medical or nursing science, as the Australian NGOs provided a liberal environment and knowledge for Korean trainees. In early 1950, five Koreans came to Australia for their postgraduate studies. Among them, Ch'ŭng Soo Huh was studying Political Science; Ch'o Min Ha was in theological education at Ridley College; and Lee P'ong Ŭn pursued a graduate study in Medicine: 'the three Korean men will pursue their studies in Australia for some time further in 1951.'[90] Miss Hong was a trained nurse, gaining experience in medical practice at St. Andrew Hospital. Another young man had also been sponsored by the United Nations Commission to study textiles at Gordon Technical College in Geelong, Victoria.[91] The experience of two years' study and Australian life not only provided them with an opportunity to build up an open mind to Western personal life but also motivated them to have social leadership skill for modern Korean society. When Miss Hong returned to Korea, she was promoted to Matron of the Severance Hospital in Seoul, in September 1953.[92] Mr Ch'o was interested in carrying on the Student Volunteer Movement (SCM) in Korea. Ch'ŭng Soo Huh became the Vice-Minister of Education in the Korean government.[93] Such an overseas education was an alternative method by which young Koreans were able to obtain a global perspective for the democratization of Korea.

Conclusion

The Korean War (1950–1953), which was caused by the political tension of two global ideologies between the Capitalist West and the Soviet Bloc, brought further mental suffering to the Korean people after colonial hardships (1910–1945). The peninsula nation did not have enough time to modernise its society by itself. Meanwhile, Western NGO volunteerism was one of the key sources through which the local people were able to learn new technologies and Western knowledge. The effort of Australian volunteers, initialised in 1889, was consistently continued, even during the Korean War. Their cultural and geographical knowledge on the regions of Pusan and Kyŏngnam Province was advanced and provided useful information for other foreign NGO organisations (including the Swedish and German Red Crosses).[94]

While 17,000 Australian soldiers were on the battlefield, Australian volunteers were involved in various projects of relief, medical work, religious mission, and modern education. Despite the fact that those works could not be performed at the same time, the social impact of the Australian workers cannot be denied. Especially, the health and security of women and children were their priority, in order to sustain family life after the humanitarian relief project. The Ilsin medical project was one of the first maternity hospitals in the southern region of South Korea. The various types of support (including pastoral care) to the POWs affected their life, in terms of changing their ideology from communism to democracy. The educational services in Korea and Australia offered great opportunities for young Koreans who until then did not have hope for themselves. The availability of modern education became the social foundation of success in their region and nation. Thus, the number of Australian volunteers may have been insignificant during the war, but their influence as volunteers under the federal support of Australia was the central axis of Western NGO groups between 1950 and 1953.

Notes

1. Gavan McCormack, *Cold War, Hot War: An Australian Perspective on the Korean War* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1983). Jung-Hyoo K'o, 'The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Korean Problem during the Pacific War,' *Acta Korana* 17, 1 (June, 2014): 429–453.
2. Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 211–212.
3. In May 1950, war loomed on the still divided Korean peninsula and military observers began to undertake monitoring activities in the field supplemented by UNCOK. Two Australian observers, Major F.S.B. Peach and Squadron Leader R.J. Rankin, were on the ground in Korea. Whilst it was Australia's smallest peacekeeping contingent, it was one of the most important as they were the only UNCOK observers in place when North Korea invaded South Korea in late June 1950. Their thorough report proved that North Korea had initiated

hostilities and provided the evidence needed for the UN to intervene in South Korea. 'United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) 1950,' https://www.awm.gov.au/conflict/CN500118/, approached on 16/03/2016.

4. The UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) occurred as part of the Korean War in 1951. Many of the participating nations include those who participated in the United Nations Command. 'United Nations Security Council Resolution 82,' June 25 1950. Bradley Lynn Coleman, 'The Colombian Army in Korea, 1950–1954,' *The Journal of Military History* (Project Muse (Society for Military History)) 69 (4): 1137–1177. Stanley Sandler, 'Select Bibliography of the Korea War,' *Magazine of History* 14, 3 (Spring, 2000): 6–9. Robert Barnes, 'Branding an Aggressor: The Commonwealth, the United Nations and Chinese Intervention in the Korea War, November 1950–January 1951,' *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, 2 (April, 2010): 231–253.
5. The nine warships of the Royal Australian Navy comprised one carrier, four destroyers, and four frigates. David Hobbs, 'British Commonwealth Carrier Operations in the Korea War,' *Air & Space Journal* 18, 4 (Winter, 2004): 62–71.
6. Three hundred and thirty-nine soldiers died and 1200 were wounded. Richard Trembath, 'A Lie Based on a Delusion: Australia's Role in the Korea War Germ Warfare Controversy,' *Social Alternatives* 23, 3 (2004): 6–10.
7. Edgar Jones and Ian P. Palmer, 'Army Psychiatry in the Korea War: the Experience of 1 Commonwealth Division,' *Military Medicine* 165, 4 (2000): 256–260.
8. 'Women in Action—Nurses and Serving Women,' http://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/australian-story/women-in-action, approached on 16/03/2016.
9. 'The Outlook in Korea,' *the Chronicle of the Presbyterian Women's Missionary Union of Victoria* (April, 1950): 11–12.
10. Sang Gyoo Lee, *To Korea with Love: Australian Presbyterian Mission Work in Korea, 1889–1941* (Melbourne: PVC, 2009), 102–110.
11. Hŭng Soo K'im, 'The Korea War (1950–1953) and Christianity: Pro-American Activities of the Christian Churches and the North Korean Reactions,' *Madang* 16 (Dec., 2011): 135–158.
12. There were about forty refugee camps in Pusan during the Korean War. Ŭn-K'young K'ong, 'the Formation of Woo-Arm Dong and its Spacious Characteristic,' in *The Space and Life of the Woo-Arm Dong People*, edited Hyŏn Yu and Sang-Su K'im (Pusan: Shin-Hyung Ki-hak, 2015), 60–61 & 254–256.
13. According to the UN Civil Assistance Command (UNCACK), there were approximately 267,000 refugees in Pusan in March 1951. Hyun-ju Lee, *Provisional Capital Memorial Hall* (Pusan: Shin-Hyung Ki-hak, 2012), 55. 'Korea's Urgent Need for Help,' *the Chronicle of the Presbyterian Women's Missionary Union of Victoria* (Feb., 1951): IV. The original journal (*the Chronicle of the Presbyterian Women's Missionary Union of Victoria*) will henceforth be abbreviated as *CPWMUV*.
14. 'Pusan in Wartime,' *CPWMUV* (Mar., 1951): 10–11.
15. There were nine YMCA centres in Korea: Pusan, Taegu, Taejŏn, Mokpo, Masan, Kwangju, Choc'hiwŏn, Kunsan, and Chinhae. 'The Y.M.C.A. in Korea,' *CPWMUV* (July, 1952): 11–12.

16. 'Pusan in Wartime,' *CPWMUV* (Mar., 1951): 11. 'News Items from Korea,' *CPWMUV* (May, 1951): 6.
17. 'Our Missionary Mail Bag,' *CPWMUV* (Feb., 1951): 11.
18. 'Korea's Urgent Need for Help,' *CPWMUV* (Feb., 1951): IV.
19. 'A Trip to Chinju,' *CPWMUV* (Mar., 1951): 6–7.
20. 'Korea,' *CPWMUV* (Mar., 1951): 10.
21. 'Pusan in Wartime,' *CPWMUV* (Mar., 1951): 11.
22. 'APC Notes,' *CPWMUV* (Sep., 1951): 13.
23. 'Our Church's Relief Work in Korea,' *CPWMUV* (Dec., 1951): 10–12.
24. 'Our Church's Relief Work in Korea,' *CPWMUV* (Dec., 1951): 10–12. Sang-Su Kim, 'the Formation of Woo-Arm Dong and its Spacious Characteristic,' in *The Space and Life of the Woo-Arm Dong People*, edited Hyŏn Yu and Sang-Su Kim (Pusan: Shin-Hyung Ki-hak, 2015), 122–125.
25. Ibid.
26. 'The Needs of Korea,' *CPWMUV* (Dec., 1954): 5–6.
27. 'Foreign Mission Committee Notes,' *CPWMUV* (Feb., 1952): 9.
28. 'Notes from the Foreign Mission Committee,' *CPWMUV* (Oct., 1952): 10.
29. 'Our Korean Field,' *CPWMUV* (Oct., 1952): 11–12.
30. 'A Glimpse of Ravaged Korea,' *CPWMUV* (July, 1952): 5.
31. 'Our Korean Field,' *CPWMUV* (Oct., 1952): 13. 'Suffering Korea,' *CPWMUV* (Dec., 1952): 7–8.
32. 'FMD Notes,' *CPWMUV* (Apr., 1951): 12.
33. Helen and Cath left Australia for Korea on 7th November 1951. 'Minutes of Meeting of P.W.M.U. General Committee,' *CPWMUV* (Aug., 1951): 12. 'About Our Friends,' *CPWMUV* (Dec., 1951): 12.
34. The Pusanchin church was originally established by early Australians who arrived in Pusan in the pre-colonial period.
35. According to the report of the UN Civil Assistance Command (UNCACK), there were 912,000 people in September 1953. Lee, *Provisional Capital Memorial Hall*, 55.
36. 'About Our Friends,' *CPWMUV* (June, 1952): 2.
37. The UNCACK was a United Nations military agency that was involved in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korea during the Korean War from 1950 until 1953. Along with the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), UNCACK was one of the major organisations involved in providing humanitarian assistance to Korea during the war.
38. 'The Strange Korea of Today,' *CPWMUV* (June, 1952): 9–10.
39. Ibid., 9.
40. Ibid., 10.
41. 'A Glimpse of Ravaged Korea,' *CPWMUV* (July, 1952): 5–6. 'Notes from the Foreign Mission Committee,' *CPWMUV* (Oct., 1952): 10.

42. 'Our Korea Filed,' *CPWMUV* (Oct., 1952): 11–12. 'A Glimpse of Ravaged Korea,' *CPWMUV* (July, 1952): 5–6. 'Seoul Today—A Shattered City,' *CPWMUV* (Sep., 1952): 6–7.
43. 'Pokseegie—Bread Cast on Water,' *CPWMUV* (July, 1952): 5–6.
44. 'Minutes of Meeting of General Committee of the PWMU,' *CPWMUV* (Aug., 1952): 11–12. 'The New Hospital in Korea,' *CPWMUV* (Nov., 1952): 8. Ki-Su Kim, *Survey of Pusan Modern Heritage Buildings*, reported to Pusan Metropolitan City, 02, 2005, 106–107.
45. 'Foreign Mission Committee Notes,' *CPWMUV* (Aug., 1952): 9–10.
46. 'Minutes of Meeting of General Committee of the PWMU,' *CPWMUV* (Aug., 1952): 11–12.
47. 'How Can You Help,' *CPWMUV* (Sep., 1952): 5.
48. 'About Our Friends,' *CPWMUV* (Nov., 1952): 4–8.
49. 'Letter from Sister Catherine Mackenzie,' *CPWMUV* (Mar., 1953): 4–5.
50. The number of beds was increased from fourteen to twenty by July 2 1953. 'Letter from Sister Catherine Mackenzie, Pusan, Korea,' *CPWMUV* (May, 1952): 4. 'About Our Friend,' *CPWMUV* (Sep., 1952): 2.
51. 'Letter from Sister Catherine Mackenzie,' *CPWMUV* (Oct., 1953): 6–7.
52. The generous gift ($5,000) of the UNRRA (United Nations Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency) was used to build the annex building of the hospital just before the end of the Korean War.
53. Zainichi Koreans means ethnic Koreans living in Japan.
54. It was the second forceful departure since 1940–41, when the colonial government of Korea issued a deportation order for the launch of the Greater East Asia War (Dai Tō-A Sensō: 1941–1945).
55. 'Korean Christians in Japan,' *CPWMUV* (Feb., 1951): 4–5.
56. 'Korean Christians in Japan,' *CPWMUV* (Feb., 1951): 4–5.
57. Miss McNabb had good Korean and Japanese language skills to communicate with Koreans in Japan. 'News from Tokyo,' *CPWMUV* (Oct., 1951): 11–12. 'Reports,' *CPWMUV* (April, 1952): 13.
58. 'News from Tokyo,' *CPWMUV* (Oct., 1951): 11–12.
59. 'Minutes of Meeting of General Committee of the P.W.M.U.,' *CPWMUV* (Aug., 1952): 11–12.
60. 'Extracts from the Letters from Miss B. McNabb, Korea,' *CPWMUV* (Mar., 1953): 6–7.
61. 'News Items from Korea,' *CPWMUV* (May, 1951): 6–7.
62. 'Korean's Urgent Need for Help,' *CPWMUV* (Mar., 1951): 1–2.
63. 'A Trip to Chinju,' *CPWMUV* (Mar., 1951): 1–2.
64. 'From the Rev H.W. Lane, Pusan, 11/01/1951,' *CPWMUV* (Mar., 1951): 11–12.
65. 'Our Church's Relief Work in Korea,' *CPWMUV* (Dec., 1951): 10–12.
66. 'The Strange Korea of Today,' *CPWMUV* (Jun., 1952): 9–10.
67. 'The Rev. George Anderson, M.A.,' *CPWMUV* (Aug., 1952): 9–10.

68. 'Our Korean Field,' *CPWMUV* (Oct., 1952): 11–12.
69. 'The Needs of Korea,' *CPWMUV* (Dec., 1954): 5–6.
70. Ibid., 6.
71. 'News Items from Korea,' *CPWMUV* (May. 1951): 7.
72. Ibid.
73. 'The Stranger Korea of Today,' *CPWMUV* (June, 1952): 9. 'The Y.M.C.A. in Korea,' *CPWMUV* (July, 1952): 11–12.
74. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, 'Prisoner Number 600,001: Rethinking Japan, China and the Korean War 1950–1953,' *The Journal of Asian Studies* 74, 2 (May, 2015): 411–432.
75. 'Pusan in Wartime,' *CPWMUV* (Mar., 1951): 10–11.
76. 'P.O.W. Congregations in Korea,' *CPWMUV* (April, 1952): 8–9.
77. 'Foreign Mission Committee Notes,' *CPWMUV* (May, 1952): 11–12.
78. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, 'Prisoner Number 600,001: Rethinking Japan, China and the Korean War 1950–1953,' *The Journal of Asian Studies* 74, 2 (May, 2015): 420–425.
79. 'A Visit to Koje Do,' *CPWMUV* (June, 1953): 8–9.
80. 'About Our Friends,' *CPWMUV* (Sep., 1952): 3–4.
81. O. Yul Kwon, and Gregory J. Trotman, 'Australian Perceptions of Korea: Need for Koreans Studies,' *Korea Observer* 33, 4 (Winter, 2002): 619–623. 'Our Korean Field,' CPWMUV (Oct., 1952): 11.
82. 'About Our Friends,' *CPWMUV* (Nov., 1952): 3–4. 'Personal Report (M. Withes, June, 1949),' *CPWMUV* (Feb., 1949): 7.
83. 'Fifteen Days in Korea,' *CPWMUV* (Dec., 1952): 4–5.
84. 'About Our Friends,' *CPWMUV* (Nov., 1952): 4.
85. 'Extracts from Letter from Miss B. McNabb, Korea,' *CPWMUV* (Mar., 1953): 6–7.
86. 'Seoul Today—A Shattered City,' *CPWMUV* (Sep., 1953): 6–7.
87. 'Letter from Rev G. Anderson (23rd Sep., 1953),' *CPWMUV* (Dec., 1953): 12–13.
88. 'Korea, Extracts from Annual Report 1953,' *CPWMUV* (Aug., 1954): 8–9.
89. 'Pokseegie—Bread Cast on Water,' *CPWMUV* (Aug., 1952): 8–9. 'After Many Days—Another Instance,' *CPWMUV* (May, 1954): 8–10.
90. 'Korea,' *CPWMUV* (March, 1951): 10. 'P.O.W. Congregations in Korea,' *CPWMUV* (Apr., 1952): 11–13.
91. 'Korean Orphans and Our Mission Boxes,' *CPWMUV* (April, 1950): 10. 'Farewell Messages,' *CPWMUV* (May, 1952): 5–6.
92. 'Seoul Today—A Shattered City,' *CPWMUV* (Sep., 1953): 6–7.
93. 'Letter from Rev G. Anderson,' *CPWMUV* (Dec., 1953): 10.
94. Therefore, their NGO volunteerism was the most effective tool for Kyungnam Koreans and war refugees, even though there were ten doctors and thirty nurses at the Swedish Red Cross of Pusanchin for soldiers. Ŭn-K'young K'ong, 'the Formation of Woo-Arm Dong

and its Spacious Characteristic,' in *The Space and Life of the Woo-Arm Dong People*, edited Hyeon Yu and Sang-Su Kim (Pusan: Shin-Hyung Ki-hak, 2015), 64–66. Sang-Su Kong, 'the Location of Woo-Arm Dong,' in op. cit., 104–107. Jin-Man Son, *My Love Pusanchin: Chasing the traces of the History* (Pusan: Dae-hun Ki-Planning, 2010), 132–133.

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THE KOREAN WAR AND THE EAST ASIAN PEACE

CHARLES ARMSTRONG

The Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies in the
Social Sciences department of Columbia University

Abstract

Following a century of nearly continuous violent conflict, the East Asian region has not experienced major inter-state warfare since 1979. At the same time, the divided Korean peninsula has been in a state of military tension and hostility just short of warfare since 1953. The co-existence of the 'East Asian peace' and the Korean conflict may not be as paradoxical as it appears. The frozen conflict on the Korean peninsula has been at the centre of East Asian geopolitics since the early Cold War, in effect serving as a substitute for direct hostilities among China, the US, Russia and Japan. Ultimately however the Korean armistice, and hence the East Asian peace, is a fragile construct based on a military standoff that could easily break out into open warfare. The East Asian peace cannot last without a long-term solution to the 'Korean question': the problem of sovereign authority and external influence on the Korean peninsula that has been central to East Asian history since at least the nineteenth century.

Key words: Korean War, peacebuilding, Korean armistice, regional peace mechanisms

THE KOREAN WAR AND THE EAST ASIAN PEACE

Charles Armstrong

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Korea and the End of the Cold War

Let me begin, if I may, by recounting some of my own formative experiences involving Korea, Britain, and late Cold War history. I first arrived in London in August of 1987, to start a graduate course in International Relations at the London School of Economics. I had spent the previous three years as a student and English instructor in East Asia: two in Seoul, Korea and one in Changchun, in Northeast China. Having then more time and curiosity than money and good sense, I decided to take a lengthy and economical route from China to Britain: by train across Mongolia, Russia and Eastern Europe, terminating in West Berlin. How I would get from there to London was unclear but I was certain I would find a way. Neither I nor any of my fellow passengers knew at the time that we were traveling through the twilight of the Cold War, across nations that within a few years would radically change their politics or even cease to exist: the Mongolian People's Republic, the Soviet Union, the Polish People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic and its capital East Berlin. From West Berlin I rode in a red BMW driven by a German yuppie—then a new species—to London via car ferry (no Chunnel in those days) and was deposited at Holborn, thence to embark what became two years of post-graduate study, discovering along the way that I was less interested in studying the world as such than understanding more deeply East Asia, and Korea in particular.

Although a student at the LSE, my research interest in East Asia led me to spend much of my time in the SOAS library, conveniently reached via a free stroll through the British Museum. I attended my first British Association of Korean Studies conference in April 1988, at Hughes Parry Hall at the University of London, and I was shocked to uncover recently the mimeographed, one-page program of that event and see so there so many familiar names, colleagues from whom I continue to learn so much: James Hoare, James Grayson, Keith Howard, Boudewijn Walraven, Aidan Foster-Carter. The program also included a presentation by one C. Armstrong entitled 'The Korean Minority in Northeast China' (plus slides). In those pre-powerpoint days, slides meant literal slabs of plastic, and were a relatively rare treat at an academic forum.

I left Britain in the fateful autumn of 1989 for a PhD course in History at the University of Chicago, while back across the Atlantic the communist world of Eastern Europe was beginning to crumble. Within a year Germany was unified, within two the Soviet Union had collapsed. The Cold War, the atmosphere my generation had breathed all our lives, was over. Korea had always been deeply embedded in that conflict, a 'divided nation in a divided world' as the Koreanist Gregory Henderson called it,[1] and therefore surely the end of the global Cold War divide would mean the end of divided Korea. A good number of Koreanists predicted that very outcome. But the end of the Cold War did not precipitate Korean unification, and in a sense my entire career since that time, over the past twenty-five years, has been an attempt to explain why that is the case.

The East Asian Peace

Part of the answer of why Korea remains divided has to do with the very different histories of the Cold War in Europe and East Asia. Neither peace nor war was the same thing on the opposing ends of the Eurasian continent in the second half of the twentieth century. The paradox of Korea in East Asia is that the Korean peninsula has been in a state of suspended war since July 1953, while the region as a whole is in a condition of peace that is highly unusual in the contemporary world and unprecedented in East Asia's own modern history. Over the last few years the Uppsala University project on the 'East Asian Peace' has tried to analyze and explain this phenomenon, which does indeed seem remarkable.[2] This project defines East Asia geographically as consisting of China, Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Taiwan, and the countries that currently comprise ASEAN: in other words, both Northeast and Southeast Asia. Between the Opium Wars around 1840 and the end of the Vietnam War in the late 1970s, this region suffered almost continuously from colonial wars, civil wars, violent revolutions, and interstate conflict often involving external actors such as the United States and the Soviet Union. World War II lasted longer and consumed comparable numbers of lives in East Asia as in Europe; the greatest casualties were in the Soviet Union (20 million dead) and China (14 million). Between 1946 and 1979, according to data from the Peace Research Institute Oslo, 80% of global combat deaths were in East Asia, where the Cold War was 'hottest,' due especially to the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, and the three Indochina Wars. The 1970s ended with the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, intended to punish Vietnam for its occupation of Cambodia. That was the last inter-state war in East Asia to date. In the 1980s, East Asia's share of global combat deaths fell to 8.5%. Now it is less than 4%, and rates of violent death in general are comparable to Western Europe and much lower than the Americas.[3]

To be sure, there continue to be domestic political conflicts, often with an ethnic



Figure 1. Annual Battle Deaths in East Asia and Globally

Source: Stein Tønnesson, 'The East Asian Peace: How Did It Happen? How Deep Is It?,' *Global Asia*, vol. 10, no. 4 (Winter 2015) https://www.globalasia.org/bbs/board.php?bo_table=articles&wr_id=9073.

or religious character, in places such as Myanmar and Thailand. But in terms of inter-state warfare East Asia has experienced a remarkable 'long peace.'

What explains this East Asian peace? Several possibilities present themselves, not necessarily as mutually exclusive explanations:

- A stable 'balance of power,' or rather continued US hegemony in the region guaranteeing security to its allies and to the region as a whole, now perhaps under challenge from a rising China
- Shared prosperity in which nations pursue economic development and cooperation over ideological and political differences, differences that may return the region to conflict if prosperity declines
- Or, more optimistically, the East Asian Peace is embedded in a thickening web of economic, legal, political and diplomatic institutions developing which will lead to a deepening sense of East Asian community, and even a sense of shared culture.

- Finally, perhaps it is a peace based on internal repression of varying degrees, in which domestic regimes keep a lid on internal conflict that might otherwise spill over into violence, including inter-state violence; alternatively, states encourage nationalism in order to deflect social discontent, potentially undermining this regional peace.

Any or all of these factors in combination might help explain the East Asian peace, but what the entire premise of the East Asian peace tends to neglect is that there is a deep, unresolved and potentially explosive conflict at the heart of East Asia: the unfinished Korean War.

Centrality of the Korean Conflict

Korea was the site of two major wars around the turn of the twentieth century, the (first) Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. Both of these wars had profound geopolitical consequences, triggering in the first instance a half-century of conflict between China and Japan and the incorporation of Taiwan into the Japanese empire, and in the second helping to precipitate the first Russian revolution and the deepening of Japanese power into Manchuria, Sakhalin Island and Korea. But it was the third modern war in Korea, the conflict of 1950–1953, that was the most devastating and had the greatest global impact. All three great conflicts of post-World War II East Asia were at their core civil wars: the struggle between Guomindang and the Chinese Communists, the North–South war in Korea, and the war in Vietnam.

Of the three, only one has been definitively resolved: the Vietnamese civil war, which ended with Hanoi's conquest of South Vietnam in April 1975, notwithstanding the brief Third Indochina War among Cambodia, Vietnam and China in 1978–9. The Chinese Civil War ended in 1949 with the victory of the Communists on the mainland, but the retreat of the Guomindang forces to Taiwan has remained to this today the last vestige of the war's incompleteness, and nearly seventy years later there remains a sometimes tense but relatively stable status quo between the separate governments of Taiwan and the People's Republic. The Chinese and Korean civil wars, exacerbated and shaped initially in a Cold War environment, have yet to reach a definite conclusion a quarter-century after the Cold War's ostensible end.

The straits of Taiwan are a major flashpoint in the region, but the conflict there is less direct and volatile, and the status quo seems on the surface at least more sustainable. Korea is a different story. Korea is the one place in the world where the United States and China face each other militarily through their allies, to whom both are bound by treaty to defend. Large armies backed by nuclear weapons are amassed on both sides of the inter-Korean boundary, and despite periodic breakthroughs in inter-Korean relations, the struggle for competitive legitimacy between Pyongyang

and Seoul continues to this day. What made the 1950–53 war in Korea larger than a civil war, and far more destructive, was the intervention of Great Powers: the Soviet Union indirectly, the United States directly, and the People's Republic of China. Korea was the battlefield that substituted for a US-Soviet war in Europe or a US intervention on the Chinese mainland. It was, in William Stueck's phrase, a 'substitute for World War III.'[4] For the Americans, the Soviets and the Chinese, it was a 'limited war,' even if for Koreans it was total war. And with the end of active hostilities came a limited peace: not the resolution of war, but a solidification of battle lines leaving both sides to spend years, than decades, preparing for hostilities to resume.[5]

The July 1953 cessation of hostilities but not of confrontation—the distinction here is critical—was intended from the beginning as a temporary measure, a compromise that would make do until a permanent solution was found. To date no such solution has been found, and the Koreas still exist in a state of conflict short of war that has now lasted over sixty years. Resolving this dilemma appears more problematic than ever. Voluntary integration between the two Koreas, who not only have opposing political and economic systems but have become vastly different societies over more than two generations, depends on a level of mutual trust that seems far beyond the horizon. A 'Vietnam solution' for Korean division, in which one side conquers the other military, is now almost unthinkable: with both sides backed by nuclear weapons, the consequences of war between the Koreas would be catastrophic not just for the Korean peninsula, but for the entire region, potentially even triggering a conflict between the US and China. The oft-revived hope that North Korea would simply go away and Korea would peacefully be unified under Seoul has proven time and again to be fanciful. But while divided Korea serves as a source of tension and indirect conflict between the US and China, it is also a buffer between rival interests. Without Korea, the conflict between the US and China might be more direct, and vastly more dangerous. Seen from this perspective, the unfinished Korean War helps to maintain the East Asian peace. Consequently however, the East Asian peace itself is fragile, dependent on a balance of terror in Korea that can easily be broken. A strong and sustainable East Asian peace requires a clear and peaceful solution to the 'Korea problem.' How that can be achieved is beyond the scope of this talk and, it seems, beyond the imagination of those involved on all sides of the Korean confrontation.

Korea in East Asian Peace and Conflict: A 400-Year Perspective

Here I would like to digress for a few moments and step back some four centuries to offer some thoughts about how East Asia generally, and Korea specifically, might be a good place from which to rethink modern international relations as a whole and not merely our own era. In the very first lecture of my required IR theory class at LSE, we were informed that modern international relations began with the Treaty (or rather

treaties) of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648. I was skeptical of this assertion at the time, and am now convinced that it is simply wrong. The 'myth of 1648,' to use the title of the pioneering book on the subject by IR scholar Benno Teschke,[6] has since been largely debunked, albeit mostly in terms of re-examining Europe's own history. Teschke and others have argued that Westphalia was not really an agreement among states, that it did not advocate or articulate modern forms of sovereignty, that it was fundamentally pre-modern in many respects. Such critics of the 'Westphalia origins' thesis tend to push the beginning of modern international relations much later, often to the rise of Britain and global capitalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[7] But there tends to be little detailed engagement in this scholarship with what was happening elsewhere in the world at the time of Westphalia, assuming that whatever the exact cause and date, international relations is a European invention, the starting point of, in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson's phrase, 'the expansion of international society.'[8]

If International Relations depends for its very definition on 'the nation,' however, it may not be the case that the nation, and hence international relations, is a purely European construct. It might be found emerging elsewhere independent of events in Europe, and East Asia is a particularly likely location. If nations can be found outside of European history, than so presumably can 'international relations.' Eric Hobsbawm refers in passing to China, Japan and Korea as 'historic nations' as opposed to modern invented ones, but does not go into depth of how these nations might be historic.[9] My late colleague JaHyun Kim Haboush, in her final posthumous book on the Imjin Wars or Japanese invasions of Korea in the 1590s, argues that the Korean 'discourse of nation' arises precisely out of these invasions and to a lesser extent from the Manchu invasions 30 and 40 years later.[10] Using a wealth of documentary, literary, and commemorative sources, Haboush finds ample evidence that the Imjin Wars profoundly changed the relationship of Korea's people to the Joseon state, creating a pre- or early-modern nationalism that was more than sufficiently fertile ground for the modern nationalism that would come later. This emerged through the intense and even traumatic interaction of Joseon with Japan, Ming China, and the Manchus. National identity, defined territory, and bounded sovereignty converged in the East Asia of the late 16th and early 17th centuries as much as—indeed, arguably more than—they did in Europe of the same period. 'Modernity,' however we define it, may be new to East Asia (or maybe not); the discourse of nation, for good or ill, has a much longer pedigree.

Korean Peace and East Asian Peace

Let me return to the end of my train journey through the twilight of Cold War civilization. Divided Korea seemed so obviously a part of the Cold War landscape that

a shift in that landscape would inevitably affect if not utterly transform divided Korea. Many thought the end of the Cold War would mean the end of the Korean conflict, or more specifically the end of North Korea. But that did not happen, and more than a quarter-century later we still have an unfinished war on the Korean peninsula. I would suggest that what we should have learned by now is that the Korean division was not an epiphenomenon of the Cold War after all. Rather, like the divisions of China and Vietnam, it is a frozen civil war fought over the character of the postcolonial nation, one that the Cold War exacerbated but did not create (unlike the case of divided Germany). The chronology of the West does not necessarily map neatly onto the chronology of East Asia, and not only in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Nor, by the same token, should we expect East Asia's future to mirror that of Europe.

Decolonization and the rebuilding of modern nation-states were the driving forces of twentieth-century East Asia; the Cold War shaped and intensified the conflicts associated with these developments, but was not the primary motivator. Nor, as mentioned earlier, have all of these conflicts been resolved. It is far from inconceivable that the frozen conflicts across the Taiwan Strait and the De-Militarized Zone could unfreeze, and the East Asian peace could give way to another period of war. Or, to site other areas of conflict, competing sovereignty claims in the East or South China Sea could lead to open confrontation involving some of the world's most militarily powerful nations—including the United States. The East Asian peace, in my view, is a fragile phenomenon and nowhere more than on the Korean peninsula.

And on this point I would like to make some final comments about East Asian nationalism in contemporary global perspective. By many measures nationalism has been on the rise in East Asia in recent years, as all three countries come into dispute over perceived historical grievances, military growth, and territorial boundaries. Often this is seen as a sign of East Asia's backwardness, 'Asia's paradox' as President Park Geun-hye [Pak Kŭnhye] [has called it: economic integration clashing with an atavistic nationalism.[11] Europe, according to long-standing conventional wisdom, has overcome these issues and is an exemplar of community for East Asia's future. But in fact it might be the other way around: it is East Asia that more accurately points to the global future, one of re-emergent nationalism and nativism. One need look no farther than contemporary Britain, or the current Presidential election in the US, to see evidence for this resurgence. A postwar liberal order based on shared prosperity, free trade, open travel, shared cultures and common institutions for which the European Union has been both a microcosm and exemplar, is facing deep challenges both within Europe and globally.

Far from superseding the nation and entering an age of globalized postmodern international relations, the modern interstate system may only now fully be coming into its own.[12] And to understand how we got here, it might be more fruitful to study East Asia in the 1590s—the first Korean War—than Westphalia in 1648.

Notes

1. Gregory Henderson et al, eds. *Divided Nations in a Divided World* (New York: McDay, 1974).
2. See Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, East Asian Peace Program. http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/eap/.
3. Stein Tønnesson, 'The East Asian Peace: How Did It Happen? How Deep Is It?' *Global Asia* vol. 10. No. 4 (Winter 2015), pp. 8–9.
4. William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 348.
5. Charles K. Armstrong, 'Introduction: A Limited Peace,' *Journal of Korean Studies* vol 18, no. 2 (Fall 2013), special issue on The Korean Armistice after Sixty Years.
6. Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations* (Verso 2003).
7. An important and persuasive argument along these lines is made in Barry Buzan and George Lawson, *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
8. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds. *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford University Press, 1985).
9. E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge University Press, second edition, 1990), p. 66.
10. JaHyun Kim Haboush, *The Great East Asian War and the Birth of the Korean Nation* (Columbia University Press, 2016).
11. Park Geun-hye, 'A Plan for Peace in North Asia:,' *The Wall Street Journal* 12 November 2012. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323894704578114310294100492.
12. As Teschke puts it, in the aftermath of 1989 'modern international relations may just have arrived on a global scale.' Teschke, *Myth of 1648*, p. 268.

OWEN LATTIMORE AND RESEARCH ON THE SINO-KOREAN BORDERLANDS, 1931–1946

Adam Cathcart

Lecturer in Chinese history, University of Leeds

Abstract

Owen Lattimore was an early student of frontiers in East Asia, and this paper takes as its point of departure Lattimore's collection of books and articles relating to Koreans in Manchuria, and the border between Manchuria (then Manchukuo) and Korea. The paper indicates the depth of dependency that Lattimore and others had on German-language treatments of the border region during the late colonial period, and aligns with the scholarship of Suk-Jung Han in seeking new approaches to reframing the history of interactions along the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen rivers in the 1930s and 1940s.

Key words: Sino-Korean border, borderlands, Koreans in Manchuria, *Chosonjok*, Owen Lattimore, German Sinologists, Manchukuo

OWEN LATTIMORE AND RESEARCH ON THE SINO-KOREAN BORDERLANDS, 1931–1946

Adam Cathcart[1]

Introduction

The rise of 'borderland studies' in recent years has coincided—or, more accurately, collided—with a wave of public interest in the 1400-kilometer boundary between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea).[2] Scholars and journalists are continuously seeking to unpack the various modes of interaction along the two rivers (the Yalu and Tumen, respectively) that today divide the two socialist states, looking at illicit activities, North Korean joint ventures, Chinese border security and (potential) natural disasters, to name a few. To a much slower tempo, academics have re-envisioned the border region as a fertile space for the investigation of history, but have difficulty arguing for the relevance of their research amid the dominance of relatively short-term issues such as China's willingness to enforce United Nations sanctions on North Korea.[3] And in Pyongyang and Beijing, the role of the nation-state in creating hegemonic historical narratives of the border space emphasizing sovereign control and charismatic guerrilla activity seems clearer than ever today.

This paper begins a process of looking back at the border region from roughly 1931–1946, a period that saw extraordinary changes on both sides of the border.[4] In this fifteen-year period, the border space was encompassed by Japanese imperial rule or collaborator regimes, followed by a brief period of Soviet occupation and a brutal civil war on the Chinese side of the border. As seen by historians in Beijing, the 1930s and 1940s in the region also serve as a prelude to the outbreak of the Korean War and threats to the border from the United States, as well as the creation of a socialist Korean ethnic autonomous prefecture (in Yanbian, formerly known as Jiandao) where the PRC finally reorganized the Guomindang's administrative boundaries and reclaimed Japanese colonial space *in toto*.[5] Perhaps reflecting the careful editing and availability of sources in China, academic work focused on the later end of this spectrum, namely the establishment and consolidation of Chinese Communist state power in ethnic Korean areas, often has the disadvantage of seeing the period of Japanese supremacy as primarily being of interest for the expression of ethnic difference between Han Chinese and Koreans in Manchukuo, a breach

which was then left for the CCP to contend with or bind up. Suk-jung Han of Dong-a University, fortunately, has pioneered a more interesting approach wherein questions of sovereignty can be probed in part through looking at the border region between Manchukuo and colonial Korea, while scholars like Yonsei's Michael Kim bridge the 1945 divide by looking at Koreans in Manchuria without submitting to the PRC's dominant narrative.

Scholars writing about the border region during the 1930s and 40s obviously had no inkling that the region would ultimately be flanked by communist people's republics, but they did have the advantage of being intermittently in the region prior to the emergence of the PRC or the DPRK. But even that advantage had its limits, and Western scholars with any experience at all in the border region were few. First, as Owen Lattimore described in 1948, it was supremely difficult to find an individual who has "previous knowledge of the conditions of field work, combined with a knowledge, from study of the literature, of what to look for, where to look for it, and where to break new ground."[6] Add to this that sources remain a particular problem for borderland studies, and that this is true also for the study of this particular border. North Korea, already renowned for its secrecy and general unwillingness to disgorge archival documents, has not left many captured archives behind about the border region (since with the brief exception of Hyesan, the cities along the North Korean frontier with China were not occupied by US or ROK forces in the autumn of 1950).[7] No single scholar, to my knowledge, had continuous access to the region for the whole of this period, and the archival data on it is scattered around the globe and mostly closed.

This paper therefore takes as its starting point the private library and publications by the most prominent frontier scholar of the era, Owen Lattimore, a pioneer in what would later become 'borderland studies' and one of the most well-travelled Sinologists of his era.[8] Lattimore's work, and that of his German competitors and interlocutors in the 1930s and 40s, helps us to understand not just the well-worn question of the Japanese outlook on Manchuria, but also the position of the Manchukuo-Chosen border at the time amid other Asian frontiers. One such competitor was Sven Hedin, whose protean travel writings on Tibet in particular were of deep interest to Lattimore and filled his shelves. But when it came to Manchuria, Lattimore was more specifically reliant on a group of German scholars like Walter Fuchs, Ernest Schultze, and Gustav Fochler-Hauke who wrote extensively about Manchuria and covered the role of Koreans there and discussed the border region.[9] Lattimore's collection of books and rare materials now held at the University of Leeds help us to understand how Japanese scholars in that period (and those who followed Japanese instructions) placed Manchuria/Manchukuo and Korea into the same conceptual sphere, considered and visualized the boundary—and how Chinese scholars in the same period looked at the same region or boundary.[10] Lattimore's own

interests overflowed into multiple Chinese frontiers, and his library reflects as much (his stint in Chongqing with the Republic of China government-in-exile and advising of Chiang Kai-shek brought him into contact with many Chinese scholars and interest in the southwest), but his foundational interests in Manchuria make him an ideal portal into the border region.[11] While he never saw the Koreans in Manchuria as the key movers of history, his writing about this group and the frontiers of Manchukuo generally provide an interesting point of departure for a wider attempt to gather up sources from the period.

The paper's approach to the period just after 1945 is truncated for a few reasons which may not be entirely obvious. The first is the difficulty of engaging in cross-border studies of comparative (or perhaps interactive) socialist land reform—namely, did North Korean land reform influence Chinese Communist practice in the crucial eastern border regions of Manchuria? How much interaction existed between overseas Chinese in Korea and the counterparts on the Chinese side of the border? And to what extent did the violence of retribution killings and 'anti-bandit' operations on the Chinese side of the frontier impact or involve participants in North Korean state building? But the primary reason that 1945–46 is a cut-off point is because Lattimore's materials for this period become more slender; he left Asia and started to write more widely on geopolitics and wield his influence in the realm of US policy toward Asia.[12] For understanding of northeast China, he began to rely more upon the work produced by counterparts like O.E. Clubb, who travelled extensively in the region during the Chinese Civil War.[13] Likewise, after the war, most of Lattimore's German interlocutors began to have political problems associated with denazification, although some of their wartime scholarship was finally published. And for its part, Japanese scholarship on the region was eclipsed immediately after the war.[14]

Japan in Manchuria

In the 1930s and 1940s, Manchuria (today the three northeastern provinces of China), was among the most fantasy-laden geopolitical spaces on the globe.[15] Japanese social scientists, industrialists, military planners as well as European and American journalists crisscrossed the new colony of Manchukuo (established in February 1932) in search of a new vision for modernity but also as a method of competitively gauging Japan's colonial strength and model.[16] At the same time, Chinese intellectuals and guerilla fighters cherished the landmass as vital to China's national identity and completeness as a modern nation-state.[17]

Travel to Manchuria for Japanese tourists was often packaged with trips to Korea. One film called A Grand Tour of Manchuria and Inner Korea (*Naisenman shuuyu no tabi—Manshuuhen*, 1937), includes the crossing of the Yalu River bridge as a moment of tourist appeal on a trip which had begun in Dairen/Dalian.[18] There was

more to the Japanese experience between Korea and Manchuria than looking out at landscapes or borders, seeing the landscapes and empire through the aperture of train travel.[19] The connectivities between Mukden/Shenyang and Keijo/Seoul, were multiple.[20] For colonists in Korea, Manchuria was a vacation destination, and vice versa, with Japanese festival days being of particular interest.[21] In general, 'the Japanese colonizers [were] associated with industrial modernity and the other populations of Manchuria portrayed as nomadic, primitive and thus without a priori claims to the still "virgin land" that await[ed] transformation by the utopian modernizers.'[22] Yet in terms of borders, even the robustly transnational Greater East Asia Literary Conference (*Daitoa bungakusha taikai*) that ran after 1942, Japanese propaganda just as often extolled the need for barriers of various kinds—both in terms of physical international borders, and hygienic quarantines.[23] Lattimore travelled to Antung (present-day Dandong), the Chinese city across the river from Sinuiju, prior to the Japanese annexation and noted that the city was 'on the Korean frontier at the mouth of the Yalu, and fed by the Yalu and a branch of the Suth Manchurian Railway (besides being in communication with the Korean railway system), [and] is also dominated by Japan.'[24]

The question of sovereignty was crucial at the time—was Manchuria Chinese, Japanese, or to become functionally autonomous from both major countries? And what would its relationship be with Japan's colony of Korea? The past immediately came into play here. In a book written during the Second World War, Michael Franz wrote 'In past history, however, Manchuria was not a country with either definite borders or a uniform people, but rather an areas of contact of different types of life and societies.'[25] Such an approach focused on ethnic movement irrespective of frontiers was perhaps reflective of the influence of the German Japanologist Karl Haushofer, whose views of the Sino-Korean border are interspersed through his famous book on borderland studies.[26] But for the Japanese colonizers, there was a counterfactual insistence that the new puppet government (nominally headed by Pu Yi, the last Manchu Emperor) was itself anti-colonial, even as the Empire insisted on maintaining what it called 'zugeteiltest Land' (fushudi / 附┌地) i.e., colonial concessions. Duara argues Manchukuo had the form of a nation-state, calling it 'quasi-colonial'.[27]

The border between Korea and Manchuria was therefore a hard one, in spite of the many visualizations and slogans that indicated otherwise. So while the Japanese encouraged Korean migration into Manchuria, and the two area's embodied connectivity was conceptually strengthened by Japanese ideologists and railroad companies, the border was not necessarily easily crossed. Suk-Jung Han describes difficulty of customs checks and further indicates that the border was relatively closed. Although, Han argues, Japan was 'an immense force in an infrastructural sense', Manchukuo authorities were hardly fully permissive when it came to tariffs, migration, or a marketplace for colonial Japanese rulers in Korea.[28] In a 1946 article,

Shannon McCune also described the situation: 'The Korean side of the border was protected in the days of Japanese control by a border patrol with well-built stone block houses situated every five miles or so and intermediate posts within sight or gun-shot of each other along some stretches.'[29] Negotiation about border spaces and disputes was still necessary.

Ethnic Koreans, however, continued to move into Manchuria and the new puppet state in large numbers, encouraged by Japanese policies and propaganda. Lattimore's 1932 analysis put the primary agency at the feet of the Japanese, for whom 'the land-hunger has gone out of their blood …[now] when they go abroad, [they] go only as exploiters, never as settlers.' While recognizing anti-Japanese sentiment and "enthusiasts for the Russian type of revolution" among the Koreans who migrated to Manchuria, he also wrote: 'The Chientao Koreans are historically a rearguard; for the Koreans undoubtedly once occupied a considerable part of Manchuria, from which they were driven by the Manchus and other tribes. This and other rearguard Korean communities, are, however, now being turned into advance-guards by a fresh impulse of Korean migration toward Manchuria.'[30] Lattimore's 1932 book obviously was taking its final shape just as the Wanpaoshan incident was occurring, and his analysis has a partial character to it even as it summarizes some basic questions about sovereignty and citizenship for Koreans in the border region.

Water rights were at the center of Korean controversies in eastern Manchuria in 1932, but so too were floods. In the areas on the boundaries near Korea on the upper Tumen River, floods occurred.[31] Yanji was also flooded and set up a relief committee, and relief organizations like the White Swastika and Red Swastika also participated, predating the arrival of the Japanese state.[32] Natural disasters in the border areas and further inland heavily impacted Koreans. Nicholas Wright explains the impact on the Korean tenant farmers in what is today eastern Heilongjiang province:

> Many Koreans were more severely affected than the Japanese, suffering serious losses to their crops. Over 4,000 Korean flood refugees congregated in Harbin. Although regarding its responsibility as 'troublesome', the Japanese consulate demanded protection for the camps holding Korean refugees, and tried to persuade the Korean authorities to provide financial support.[33]

But water also led to depictions of plenty for Koreans; the easy naturalism of lumber flowing down an un-demarcated Yalu River in a Japanese textbook used by Lattimore attests to the softer side of the border which propagandists and educationalists in Japan sought to depict.[34] Tucker describes the mental geometries of the Japanese empire and its experiments in Manchuria; as he says, 'The seizure of Manchuria provided a blank slate, or as city planners in Manchukuo put it, a white page, *hakushi*, on which ideal designs might be realized.' 1932 was 'a time of intense activity and anticipation in Manchukuo, of imagined but not realized projects.'[35] Manchukuo was

seem by some Japanese as an opportunity to improve on Korean failings, in terms of architecture, environmental suitability, and even the shape of developments (the hexagon was a constant motif used by Japanese rural designers).[36] Even German city planning became influential in Japan in 1934, thanks in part to visits to Japan that year by key German architects.[37] And there were, in fact, a number of German scholars who played a role in shaping knowledge, and Owen Lattimore's understanding, of the Chinese-Korean border region.

German Sinologues and the Border Region

Control of knowledge was of course central to which researchers were allowed into Manchukuo or Korea, or their mutual border region. We tend to assume that non-Japanese researchers were not really allowed in, but this was not quite the case. As Owen Lattimore noted in a 1948 review of a major fieldwork-based study of the region:

> After the proclamation of the bogus state of 'Manchukuo' in 1932 the scientific study and description of China's Northeastern provinces became a Japanese monopoly in which the only outside participants were a few Russians and … a handful of Germans who were acceptable both to the Japanese regime and to the Hitler regime in Germany … In order to be allowed any freedom of movement behind [Japan's] heavy strategic security curtain, an American or Western European had first to pass a screening as a fellow traveler of the Kwantung Army … No noteworthy Westerners who passed this screening were also well qualified in the natural sciences, especially geography.[38]

Here Lattimore identifies a key lacuna. It is not a lack of interest in frontiers that prevented further study of the Sino-Korean border during the 1930s and early 1940s, but rather political fissures. German scholars had access to the region, while those affiliated with the Allies did not.

Some German researchers studied topics like Korean rural economy and the slash-and-burn method on hillsides in order to prepare them for spring planting.[39] In general, the interest in Koreans moving over the border into Manchukuo was an economic one. One of the most detailed investigations of this question was written by Ernst Schultze, an economist in Leipzig.[40] Entitled 'The expulsion of the Korean farmer by Japanese imperialism; an unknown chapter in East Asian world politics,' the article argued for a more historicized view of Korean migration into Manchuria, simply stating that prior to Japan's more vigorous moves in 1931, Korean migration had not been nearly as large as it subsequently became. Schultze had had a somewhat strange career, spending the 1910s writing on an array of topics that veered from film pedagogy to England as a sea power to the independence movement in Ireland to the role of prostitution in Asia. In the 1920s he built up his expertise on economic issues,

reaching a peak with a huge two-volume study of the Japanese economy with an eye toward the coming World War, in 1935. In that same year he published a study of the Nazi economy and returned to the Anglophobia of his earlier years for the duration of the decade.

Like many of his counterparts in German academies, Schultze saw Japanese imperialism as being of a grasping nature for resources, and significant in moving populations; migration was a theme of part of his two-volume study.[41] In this sense, Schultze was engaging in debate with the journalists of his day. Richard Sorge, who reported for *Frankfurter Zeitung* from Tokyo and who toured China and Korea, wrote some more extended pieces for *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* in 1937, took issue with the notion that poverty was driving migration, when technology and investment could make 'inner colonization' more possible in the region.[42]

German researchers of Manchuria and the border region with Korea were very active in the 1930s. Walter Fuchs was a journeyman German Sinologist who ended up as one of the few Western academics in Manchuria in the key years of the early 1930s. He thus performed some research work to rival or at least counterpose to the Japanese researchers of the South Manchurian Railway Company, which at the time was on its way employing a research staff that reached an apogee of some 2,345 in the late 1930s.[43] Fuchs ventured into Liaoyang and its outskirts, on the eastern side of the Liao River. In order to reach the Manchu tombs which were the subject of what would become a foundational study, Fuchs had to pass through Gaolimen, or Koryo Gate, the aperture that had once served as the boundary or a customs function between kingdoms which today would be labelled as Chinese and Korean, respectively.[44] Today, that area is the site of a huge new housing development which is largely empty.

Fuchs was a wanderer with an interest in border regions. In 1933, he published his diary from a journey into southwestern China and the city of Chengdu, an area that also fascinated Owen Lattimore.[45] During the Sino-Japanese War that erupted in the summer and autumn of 1937, he joined the Nazi Party. He was ultimately caught up in denazification back in Germany. Having moved back to Munich in 1950, he was never able to take up substantive academic employment due to his work with the Nazi Party in China after he joined the Party in 1937.[46] He appeared to have a good relationship with Lattimore, according to inscriptions on his books in the Leeds University library collection; it is possible that the men had met in the early 1930s.

Research published postwar had been started during the conflict. One good example is in his Mongol maps, published in 1946, Fuchs put forward a 'Sea route around Shantung to Manchuria' which showed Korea as more or less peripheral, and the border region as a sort of no-mans land.[47] Fuchs describes the ancient preoccupation with border regions, in a discussion of Lo Hung-hsien, in a treatment of 9 Border Regions, perhaps dating from 1560s, reflected a Ming-era sensibility to

the frontier management. Korea could here be fit into frontier states like Mongolia, Annam, and the northwest.[48] Like Lattimore, Fuchs' sense of frontiers was large and inherently comparative, rarely focusing on just one.

Notes

1. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Institute for Transnational & Spatial History, University of St. Andrews, 25 August 2017. Particular thanks are due to Dr. Konrad Lawson for generating the kernel of the paper and then soliciting it through its various permutations, as well as for his critical commentary on it, as well as to Bernhard Struck and Riccardo Bavaj at St. Andrews for attuning me to more spacial approaches to German cartographic and social history, respectively.
2. On borderland studies in Asia, see Willem Van Schendel and Erik de Maaker, 'Asian Borderlands: Introducing their Permeability, Strategic Uses and Meanings,' *Journal of Borderlands Studies* Vol. 29, No. 1 (2014), 3–9. On the Chinese-Korean border region, see Adam Cathcart, Christopher Green, and Steven Denney, eds., *De-coding the Sino-North Korean Borderlands* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, forthcoming); Koen de Custer, Valérie Gelézeau, and Alain Delissen, *Debordering Korea: Tangible and Intangible Legacies of the Sunshine Policy* (London: Routledge, 2013). On contemporary interest in the China-North Korea border region, citation of major articles from the region—typically Dandong and Yanji in China—in the *New York Times* by Jane Perlez, the *Washington Post* by Anna Fifield, and *The Guardian* by Tania Branigan in the past five years would likely fill a full page.
3. On using a sanctions framework to analyze the border region, see work by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2017); Charles A. von Denkowski, 'From state-organized crime to legal business: Transforming North Korea—A criminological approach,' in *East Asian Intelligence and Organised Crime*, Stephan Blancke, ed. (Berlin: Verlag Dr. Koester, 2015), pp. 343–396; Center for Advanced Defence Studies (C4ADS), *In China's Shadow: Exposing North Korean Overseas Networks*, ASAN Institute for Policy Studies (August 2016); John S. Park, 'North Korea, Inc.: Gaining Insights into North Korean Regime Stability from Recent Commercial Activities,' *United States Institute of Peace Working Paper*, 22 April 2009 <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/North%20Korea,%20Inc.PDF>. For slightly modulated yet essentially presentist or securitized approaches, see Justin Hastings, 'The economic geography of North Korean drug trafficking networks,' *Review of International Political Economy* Vol. 22, No. 1 (2015), 162–193; and Adam Cathcart, 'Evaded States: Security and Control in the Sino-North Korean Border Region,' in Routledge Handbook of Asian Borderlands, Alexander Horstmann, Martin Saxer, Alessandro Rippa, eds. (London: Routledge: 2018), pp. 422–433.
4. For similar arguments on the logic of this periodization, see Bruce Cumings, 'The Korean-centric Japanese Imperium and the Transformation of the International System from the 1930s to the 1950s,' *The International Order of Asia in the 1930s and 1950s*, Shigeru Akita and Nicholas White, eds. (Ashgate, 2010). Matsumoto's pathbreaking study of the role of Japanese technicians at what became the CCP's model steel factory in northeast China, Anshan steel, moves easily across conventional periodization divides. See Toshiro

Matsumoto, *Manshukoku kara shinchugoku e: anzan tekkogyo kara mita chugoku tohoku no saihen katei, 1940–1954* (Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 2000).

5. One of the only scholarly treatments of one segment of the border region, that being the Korean-dominated counties in eastern Manchuria, over the same span is Robert Oliver (University Press, 1990); for a more discursive and (Marxist) theory-heavy approach influenced by Harry Harootunian, see Hyun Ok Park, *Same Bed, Different Dreams: Settler Colonialism and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Columbia University Press, 2005).
6. Owen Lattimore, review of Gustav Fochler-Hauke's 'Die Mandschurei: Eine Geographisch-Geopolitische Landeskunde' in *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1948, pp. 303–304.
7. There have been very few examinations, particularly based on archives, of the Chinese border regions with Korea during the Chinese civil war. For use of North Korean captured archives in investigating the border region with China in the late 1940s, see Adam Cathcart and Charles Kraus: 'Peripheral Influence: The Sinuiju Incident of 1945, *Journal of Korean Studies* (Winter 2008); Charles Kraus has since produced new work on Overseas Chinese in northern North Korea.
8. This is as distinct from Lattimore's private papers, which total some 22,175 items and are held in 62 boxes at the United States Library of Congress. Lattimore's work on frontiers is sizeable; a good starting point is his *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York: American Geographical Society, 1940), a work which he discussed in the early 1930s Beijing/Beiping with Karl Wittfogel.
9. Ultimately I use the term "competitor" advisedly, as Lattimore maintained good personal relations with most members of his broad remit until his denunciation by Senator Joseph McCarthy in 1949. On the destruction of his friendship with his fellow English Sinologist George E. Taylor, see the correspondence file in the Taylor Papers in the Special Collections of the University of Washington Library, Seattle.
10. Lattimore's various maps and his collection of *Xinyaxiya* (New Asia), a periodical produced by Nationalist Chinese scholars which focused on frontier issues, as well as his interactions with such scholars, could be the basis of an article of itself. For an outstanding updated treatment of Chinese academic discourse on fieldwork, human geography, and frontiers in the 1920s and 1930s, see Zhihong Chen, 'The Frontier Crisis and the Construction of Modern Chinese Geography in Republican China (1911–1949),' *Asian Geographer* Vol. 33, No. 2 (2016), pp. 141–164.
11. Robert P. Newman, *Owen Lattimore and the 'Loss' of China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
12. Owen Lattimore, *The Situation in Asia* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1949).
13. O. Edmund Clubb, 'Chinese Communist development programs in Manchuria: with a supplement on Inner Mongolia,' (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954), 46 p.; see also Richard D. McKinzie, 'Oral History Interview with O. Edmund Clubb,' New York City, June 26, 1974, in Harry S Truman Presidential Library, <https://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/clubb.htm>.
14. Dai Maolin and Lin Po, *Zhonggong Zhongyang Dongbeiju* (The CCP Northeastern Bureau), *1945–1954* (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, 2016).

15. Annika A. Culver, *Glorify the Empire: Japanese Avant-Garde Propaganda in Manchukuo* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013).
16. Peter O'Connor, *Japanese Propaganda: Selected Readings, Series 2: Pamphlets, 1891–1939, Vol. 8, From the China Quagmire, 1937–38* (Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 2005).
17. Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
18. Jie Li, 'Phantasmagoric Manchukuo: Documentaries Produced by the South Manchurian Railway Company, 1932–1940,' *positions: east asia cultures critique*, Volume 22, Number 2 (Spring 2014), pp. 329–369 (p. 342).
19. Wolfgang Schivelbusch, 'Panoramic Travel,' in *The Nineteenth Century Visual Culture Reader* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 98. See also South Manchuria Railway Company, *Manchuria through the car window* (Dairen: Minami Manshuu Tetsudoo Kabushiki Kaisha/ General Directorate of Railways, the SMR, 1938), held at the Hoover Institution.
20. See Minami Manshuu Tetsudoo Kabushiki Kaisha (General Directorate of Railways, the SMR), *South Manchuria Railway, operating all lines in South Manchuria and Chosen (Korea) east of Mukden. Its origin, development, and phenomenal rise to importance* (Dairen: Manshu nichinichi shimbun, December 1922), held at Stanford University Library.
21. Dandong Municipal Archives, 'Yi, Yalu jiang tieqiao/一、 ┌┌江┌┌' [One: Steel bridge over the Yalu], Dandong Municipal Archives website, 3 July 2015, http://www.dddaj.com.cn/page/news.asp?id=1456.
22. Jie Li, 'Phantasmagoric Manchukuo: Documentaries Produced by the South Manchurian Railway Company, 1932–1940,' *positions: east asia cultures critique*, Volume 22, Number 2 (Spring 2014), pp. 329–369 (p. 333).
23. Junko Agnew, "Constructing Cultural Difference in Manchukuo: Stories of Gu Ding and Ushijima Haruko," *International Journal of Asian Studies* Vol. 10, No. 2 (2013), pp. 171–188 (p. 180).
24. Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict* (New York: Macmillian, 1932), p. 26.
25. Franz Michael, *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China: Frontier and Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the Chinese Empire* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), p. 12.
26. Karl Haushofer, *Grenzen in Ihrer Geographischen und Politischen Bedeutung* (Heidelberg, 2nd edition: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1939), pp. 39, 71.
27. Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 59–61, 247–247; see also Han Suk-jung 'The Problem of Sovereignty: Manchukuo, 1932–1937,' *positions: east asia cultural critique* vol. 12, no. 2 (Fall 2004), 457–478.
28. Suk-Jung Han, 'From Pusan to Fengtian: The Borderline between Korea and Manchukuo in the 1930s,' *East Asian History* vol. 30 (2005), pp. 92–93.
29. Shannon McCune, 'Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries,' *The Far Eastern Quarterly* Vol. 5, No. 3 (May 1946), p. 276.
30. Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 236, 239, 241.

31. Wright, p. 193. It was the National Food Relief Commission of GMD.
32. Wright, p. 194.
33. Tim Wright, 'Legitimacy and Disaster: Responses to the 1932 Floods in North Manchuria,' *Modern China* Vol. 43, No. 2 (2017), 186–216 (p. 198); drawing from Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR), www.jacar.go.jp.
34. *Futsu gakko kokugo kokuhon*, vol. 7 (Seoul: Chosen sotokufu, 1935), p. 109.
35. David Tucker, "City Planning without Cities: Order and Chaos in Utopian Manchukuo," in *Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire*, Marino Asano Tamanoi, ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press/Association of Asian Studies, 2005), pp. 53–81 (pp. 55, 58).
36. Tucker (2005), P. 61–64, 68.
37. Tucker (2005), p. 73, cites Gottfried Feder, *Die Neue Stadt* (The New City), Berlin: Springer, 1939.
38. Owen Lattimore, review of Gustav Fochler-Hauke, 'Die Mandschurei: Eine Geographisch-Geopolitische Landeskunde (Heidelberg: Vowinkel, 1941),' in *Pacific Affairs* (Summer 1948), pp. 303–304.
39. Hermann Lautensach, 'Űber den brandrodungsfeldbau in Korea mit bemerkungen zur urlandschaftsforschung,' *Petermanns geographische mitteilungen*, Vol. 87, No. 2 (February 1941), pp. 41–54; cited in McCune (1946), p. 276.
40. 'Die Verdraengung der koreanischen Bauern durch den japanischen Imperialismus: Ein unbekanntes Kapitel der ostasiatischen Weltpolitik,' *Wirtschaftsring* Vol. 48 (November 1934). My awareness of and discussion of this article is indebted to p. 261 of Mun Soo-Hyun, 'German Discourse on Korea during the Era of Japanese Imperialism,' *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* vol. 27, no. 2 (December 2014), pp. 241–267.
41. Ernst Schultze, *Japan als Weltindustriemacht*, 2 vols (Stuttgart, 1935).
42. Richard Sorge, in *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* (1937, no. 3), reprinted in *Dr. Sorge funkelt aus Tokio* (East Berlin: Deutsche Militaer Verlag, 1970), pp. 230–233. See also 'Japans Kampf um Lebensraum: Űbervoelkerung und Auswanderung—Der Führungsanspruch in Ostasien,' *Westdeustcher Beobachter*, 6 March 1942, in German Bundesarchiv, Auswaertiges Amt files, R901 / 58321, s. 167.
43. Akihiko Maruya, *The South Manchuria Railway Company as an Intelligence Organization* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), p. 3. See also Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire*.
44. Walter Fuchs, 'Fruehmandjurische Fürstengräber bei Liao-Yang,' *Asia Major*, ed. Bruno Schindler and Friedrich Weller, Vol. X, Leipzig, 1934, pp. 94–111.
45. Walter Fuchs, *Von Sian nach Ch'engtu, Tagebuchblaetter von einer Wanderung nach Suedwest-China* (Berlin: Seminar Feuer Orientalischen Sprachen, 1933).
46. Hellmut Wilhelm, 'German Sinology Today,' *The Far Eastern Quarterly* Vol. 8 No. 3 (May 1949), pp. 319–322.
47. Fuchs, p. 37.
48. Fuchs, p. 12–13.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Todd A. Henry, *Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945*

Steven Denney, University of Toronto

Todd Henry's *Assimilating Seoul* is the first book written about Seoul during the colonial period. It adds to the scholarship in the English language on Japanese colonial governmentality, such as Jun Uchida's work on Japanese settlers in Korea and Prasenjit Duara's study of Manchukuo. Henry uses a self-described ethnographical approach to explore 'Japanese assimilation as contested experiments of colonial governmentality.' More specifically, he looks at the 'various forms of assimilation … operated on the grounds of colonial society and in its public spaces' in Keijo (colonial Seoul; pp. 2–4). The book will be of interest to those studying colonial-era 'collaboration' and geographies of imperialism. It will be of particular value to those interested in colonial governmentality (especially hygiene, or 'biopower') and spatial perspectives on (colonial) assimilation *à la* Henri Lefebvre. There are three forms, or modes, of assimilation that Henry dissects: the spiritual, material, and civic. So as to peruse Henry's analytical gaze over colonial-era Seoul, I will focus on the third mode: civic assimilation.

In the fifth chapter Henry investigates the politics of 'colonial hygiene'. Herein we find the civic form of assimilation. Efforts to change daily habits and improve general health of Koreans were spearheaded by the Governor-General as part of its goal to bring 'civilization' to its imperial subjects on the peninsula. This was not, of course, an exercise in benevolence or the actions of a 'good' government; it was, as Duara explains in his work on Manchukuo, where the Japanese made similar efforts, an exercise in imperial 'biopower'. That is, it was an attempt to subjugate, regulate, and control the populace through the implementation of new hygiene laws and norms—because a healthy and well-groomed imperial subject is a productive and controlled subject.

Aside from showing biopower at work, Henry's study also highlights the way colonial hygiene laws, and the agents who implemented them, transformed the 'everyday', for colonial subjects. Japan's assimilation efforts, though a disingenuous effort at making Japan and Korea 'one' (i.e. *naisen ittai*), did actually succeed in transforming how life proceeded on an everyday basis for *some* of Seoul's population

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(but certainly not everyone, or even a majority). Vaccinations, new modes of storing of trash and human waste, and the availability of modern medicines altered the way Koreans lived in a way that made their daily lives more compatible with capitalist/colonial modernity. There is here a connection here between Henry's work on the everyday in colonial Seoul and Suzy Kim's study of the everyday in postwar North Korea.

The experiment in civic assimilation via the improvement of public hygiene, while largely resisted by most ordinary Koreans (for reasons of habit and financial burden), succeeded in bringing under the imperial fold the local (nationalist) elite, who supported modernizing reforms (and thus the new hygiene regime). This is captured quite well in Henry's telling of the overlapping prerogatives of the Government-General and opportunistic Korean nationalists (p. 157). Local elites, who saw Korea's backwardness (i.e. lack of 'civilization and enlightenment'), embraced hygienic modernity as a road towards self-strengthening and of class formation. Thus, writes Henry:

> Alongside these government [hygienic] programs, a group of dedicated Korean nationalists promoted their own cultural movement in Keijo and elsewhere throughout the peninsula. Embracing hygienic modernity as one of its pedagogical mantras, this movement draw on many of the same institutions and media used by their colonialist counterparts to advance their goal of strengthening the national body. (p. 157)

Henry illustrates here, that by accepting the method (hygiene improvement), local elites were unwittingly brought in as co-agents of colonial governmentality; in other words, they became strange bedfellows. Although these nationalists had agendas usually quite different from the Governor-General, cooperative local elites—'collaborators'—were used as agents of Japan's assimilation efforts. This was largely a consequence, Henry points out, of the post-1919 relaxation of coercive controls by Governor-General Saito Makoto (see the programme: 'enlist the populace in police duties, while bringing the police deeper into the daily lives of the populace', p. 158). Sanitation cooperatives would bring in local Korean leaders 'to lend greater administrative support to state projects'. This cooperation ultimately lead to the strengthening of local elite-state relations. As Andre Schmid shows in his study of the interaction between Korea's early advocates for modernising reforms and the modernising colonial state apparatus, the former found it hard to prevent itself from being co-opted from the latter. Henry underlines a similar dynamic in his book. This is 'hegemony' at its finest.

There are a few issues that scholars—especially historians—might take issue with. First: While Henry describes his work as ethnographic, he may be stretching the meaning of such an approach/method. His primary sources of information are colonial-era newspapers and imperial reports. He says he is overcoming the

tendency to study this period from the 'top-down' by focusing his analysis on Korean 'multivocal' agency through 'grounded histories of how individuals and groups operated in public places' (p. 7). Despite his better intentions, he does not seem to actually do this. Elite discourses (local elites, imperial reports, 'Orientalists', etc.) do not constitute a history from the bottom-up. This is, of course, a problem for all historians—how to write a history that is not top-down. But it is not insurmountable. Close textual readings—which take into account much more than Henry does of the conditions for the production of the text—themselves could a history from the bottom-up.

Second: Are governmentality and assimilation the same thing? Reading Henry's text one would be lead to conclude as much. But it is quite possible that in redefining the bounds of assimilation, Henry makes the category/concept of assimilation so broad that anything and everything is assimilation. Japanese efforts to subjugate the colonial population into docile subjects are certainly a facet of governmentality, but they are not always efforts geared towards assimilating said population. Assimilation is a broad tent, conceptually speaking, and it is precisely because of this that scholars doing research on assimilation policies must be crystal clear (or as clear as possible), conceptually speaking. Henry seems to fall short of conceptual clarity.

Despite these minor limitations, Todd Henry's *Assimilating Seoul* is a new and insightful perspective on how public spaces in Seoul (Keijo) were used by the colonial government in its various attempts to assimilate Koreans into the Japanese Empire.

Sho Konishi, *Anarchist Modernity: Cooperatism and Japanese-Russian Intellectual Relations in Modern Japan*

Robert Winstanley-Chesters, Australian National University

If the reader has ever encountered the stories of early Korean nationalists and proto-democrats and their seemingly ceaseless questing and traveling in the late 19th century, the extent of their internationalism surely cannot have escaped attention. Even at the death of Korean independence and annexation in 1910 the ability of Koreans to leverage emergent transnational connections in traveling to Paris to present their case for independence (unsuccessfully), strikes me as extraordinary. In our era when the globe can be crossed and connected in a matter of fourteen hours or so, politically active Koreans must have undertaken epic journeys of tenuous precarity using routes and facing dangers we cannot imagine from the window of our railway carriage or aeroplane. Sho Konishi, in this extraordinary work of scholarship, uncovers and reconfigures the journeying and interaction of a politically and intellectually active grouping of international individual actors, whose travels and exchanges have been buried and lost by the vagaries of historiography and by their own repertoires of

skilful activist technique and technology. While the individuals Konishi describes have much in common in terms of their enthusiastic, sometimes desperate encounters with modernity, those Koreans focused on independence and reform, the focus of their work and ambition was rather to deconstruct and resist the rise of the modern nation state.

History is not always about big or famous men as Niall Ferguson or David Starkey would have it; it is often about glitch, cracks, disconnections—or in the words of Koen de Ceuster, it is about social process. Konishi's narrative is necessarily about chance meetings and the wilful endeavor of individuals. Rather extraordinarily, in 1868, following hot on the heels of the Meiji Restoration, legendary anarchist and author of 'Statism and Anarchy,' Mikhail Bakunin, escaped from a prison camp in Siberia via Hakodate to a Japan in the midst of the turmoil sparked by its uncomfortable encounter with modernity. While Bakunin's time in Japan was short and he soon crossed the Pacific to San Francisco en-route eventually to Europe and status as a revolutionary legend, the political potential of the chaos he found there made a real impact on his imagination which he was happy to share with other similarly minded Russians on his return.

Revolutionary, chaotic Japan is next recounted by Konishi as central to the mind of a revolutionary apparently directly inspired by Bakunin. Lev Mechnikov was the brother to (and rather intriguingly, conceptually connected to) Ilya Mechnikov, the theorist of pro-biotics and winner of the Nobel Prize for his work on gut flora and micro-organisms. Lev Mechnikov's arrival in Yokohama in 1874 heralds only the first impactful connections tracked by Konishi within his expansive narrative field. Seeing 'Revoliutsiia' in the 'Ishin' of the Meiji period, Mechnikov sought to build new possibilities for Japanese interaction with the nation state through a cooperative form of civilization, doing so through the processes and productions of linguistic exchange and translation praxis.

Konishi establishes that through Mechnikov, Japan made its first tentative steps in linguistic expansion, reconfiguring conventional conceptions of its first encounter with modernity, so that it is Russian through which the emergent Japanese academy encountered 'Western' thought. Fascinatingly, Konishi traces the history of the current Tokyo University of Foreign Studies to Mechnikov's foundation in 1873 of the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages (TSFL). Academic and intellectual exchange spurred on by the TSFL enabled Japanese translations, or rather rewritings of the works of Bakunin, Recluse, Plekhanov, and perhaps jointly most important for the Japanese audience and narrative, those of Peter Kropotkin (especially *Mutual Aid*), and Leo Tolstoy.

The agitators and revolutionary Japanese, Konishi recounts were not focused on violent revolution as portrayed in many clichéd representations of Anarchist possibility and as theorized and longed for in Bakunin's work, but on a process of

social, temporal, spiritual re-ordering. The massive popularity of Tolstoy and as Konishi describes the co-option of a nascent Orthodox Church by Tolstoyan convert Nikolai (Ivan Dmitrievich Kasatin), for the emergent, centerless, semi-humanist spirituality, the development of a 'Non-War Movement' to counter the drive towards conflict with Imperial Russia, the enormous popularity of Esperanto in Japan at the beginning of the twentieth century and Japanese encounters with Darwinism are all coherently and cogently argued to be the direct or indirect products of this re-ordering.

While any Koreanist, of course, will be painfully aware of the eventual victory of Japan's nationalist, militarist, and imperialist tendency over these more diffuse movements, Konishi's work is a key example of the efficacy and ability of social and intellectual movements to utilize lines of flight or cracks in a perceived hegemon to find alternative ways through, around, below and beyond. While those engaged in contemporary interaction, exchange and engagement with North Korea and North Koreans both outside and within the limits of its institutional and state sovereignty cannot surely have as complex or difficult a connection to navigate or manage as Mechnikov and those revolutionaries seeking passage and interaction with the Japan of the post-Meiji era, Konishi demonstrates amply the power and possibility of non-state actors and networks and the terrain of true transnational relation. A landmark work and surely of use to scholars focused on Korea and the development of political and conceptual modernity both before and after Japanese annexation.

Koh Jongsok, ***Infected Korean Language: Purity Versus Hybridity From The Sinographic Cosmopolis To Japanese Colonialism To Global English***

Simon Barnes-Sadler, SOAS University of London

Ross King's new translation of Koh Jongsok's collection of linguistic essays is a timely and welcome addition to the growing body of work available in English questioning the dominant narrative of Korean linguistic homogeneity or 'purity'.[1] The author is a public intellectual whose strong track record of producing literary and journalistic works is matched by linguistic expertise; he received training in linguistics at Seoul National University and in Paris. Koh is considered the leading exponent of

1 See, amongst others: Ross King, 'Globalization and the Future of the Korean Language: Some Preliminary Thoughts,' in *Ŏnŏhak sanchaek*, ed. Lee Sang Oak, Park Choong-Yon and James H. Yoon (Seoul: Han'guk Munhwasa, 2007), 317–347, and David Silva 'Death, Taxes and Language Change: The Inevitable Divergence of Korean Varieties as Spoken Worldwide,' in *Contemporary Korean Linguistics: International Perspectives*, ed. Lee Sang-Oak (Paju: Thaehaksa, 2010), 300–319.

the uniquely Korean form of writing known as *ŏnŏ pip'yŏng* (language criticism), nine examples of which make up this book. They are translated into precise, readable prose by Ross King, an experienced translator of Korean linguistics and literature, currently Professor of Korean and Head of the Department of Asian Studies at the University of British Columbia. Due to this book's structure as a collection of varied essays, we discuss the pieces thematically rather than in order of their appearance in the book.

The opening pair of *ŏnŏ pip'yŏng* serve as a personal introduction to Koh in which he reflects on his experience with languages and how his attitude towards Korean developed growing up in Pak Chŏnghŭi's Korea, working as a journalist, and subsequently living in France. Koh asserts his love for Korean from the outset and links his criticism of the language with his rejection of nationalism. This philosophical stance is emphasised by his explicit comparison of linguistic purism and such absolutist political movements as the Third Reich and the regime in North Korea. This point introduces the divergence of national varieties of Korean, raising and then rejecting the possibility of policy-driven linguistic unification as a manifestation of ethno-nationalism.

Koh declares himself 'fundamentally not a supporter of national language policy' (p. 40), and thus, while he reviles attitudes and policies behind North Korean linguistic purism, imposing a policy based solution to their linguistic outcome is out of the question. Instead, Koh suggests that rather than bringing about linguistic unity by attempting to change the extant varieties of Korean, the standard languages of North and South could be re-united by re-conceptualising any linguistic divergence between them, whatever its source, as part of the ongoing linguistic enrichment of Korean as a whole.

A piece discussing the 'English as official language' (EOL) debate, started in 1998 and still showing no sign of abating, accounts for roughly half of the book's length. Here the glossary is especially helpful in providing more detailed backgrounds to the principal contributors to the EOL debate as it was carried out in the pages of the *Chosŏn Ilbo*. Koh dismisses those who are opposed to English as an official language on the grounds that their arguments have no basis in linguistic reality, a contention that he backs up by demonstrating that non-autochthonous languages, namely those of the sinographic cultural sphere, have been used for official purposes throughout Korean history.

It is suggested that these earlier situations and the incorporations into the system of Sino-Korean which resulted from them—for example the numerous borrowed Sino-Japanese coinings of the early 20th century—were more acceptable and will prove to be more durable than contemporary Western loans due to their transmission through writing and their basis in common East Asian cultural heritage—a phenomenon which parallels that of Latinate neologisms in Europe.

After a comparison of German, English, and Japanese attitudes to language purity, Koh determines that 'no policy is the best policy' (p. 178) and advocates letting the natural course of language change and shift occur. Koh's conclusion is that English will ultimately retain and consolidate its position as the global language; consequently its adoption in Korea would simply be an official extension of a natural trend and official endorsement of English would enable the whole of Korean society to benefit from access to global Anglophone culture, rather than just a privileged few.

The discussion of the EOL debate is sandwiched between two chapters devoted to writing systems: the first addressing the conflation of Hangul with the Korean language, and the second whether Korean should be written purely in Hangul or in a mixed script which incorporates Chinese characters. While direct discussion of these issues forms the core of these sections, they are also used to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the discourse of linguistic purism whether the subject is spoken or written Korean.

One further unique approach to linguistic purism taken in a different section is an examination of toponyms, specifically countries' names. While older, sinographic names for countries retain their charm for Koh, he argues for a nuanced official nomenclature in which the sinographic heritage of East Asia is taken into account along with countries' native names and widely recognised names borrowed from English into Korean. In so doing, Koh makes the case for 'correct' language use being determined by common usage which entails the rejection of prescriptive purism.

The two final sections verge on literary criticism focussing on the artistic value and semantic content of the *hyanngga* 'Song for my Dead Sister' (*Che mangmae ka*/祭亡妹歌) and the *kŏryo kayo* 'Song of the Western Capital' (*Sŏgyŏng pyŏlgok*/西京別曲) rather than their linguistic form. They differ starkly from the rest of the collection in tone and content, including an earlier section on Korean literature in which Koh discusses the distinction between Korean literature and Koreaphone literature, that is literature produced by Koreans and written in *hanmun*, say, and literature originally written in the Korean language. The notion of continuity in Korean is deconstructed by comparing older and contemporary Koreaphone literature. Koh determines that they are mutually incomprehensible and thus wholly different languages; therefore relying on older forms of Korean as a source of 'authentic' Korean brings the modern language under the influence of a language as foreign as any with origins outside of the Korean peninsula.

This collection is an excellent, if polarising, introduction to many of the more controversial issues in contemporary Korean language studies. Despite perhaps niche subject matter, Koh's personal delivery and consistent focus on the bigger picture serves to make this accessible and relevant to those with any interest in contemporary Korean society and identity, particularly their interaction with language.

Valérie Gelézeau, Koen de Ceuster, and Alain Delissen (eds)., *De-bordering Korea: Tangible and Intangible Legacies of the Sunshine Policy*

Robert Winstanley-Chesters, Australian National University

Recent North Korean denunciations of President Park Geun-hye as Obama's 'comfort woman' and older, no less vitriolic references to the 'swish of her poisonous skirt' serve to root the jovial meetings between Kim Taejung and Kim Jong Il [Kim Chŏng'il] in what feels like the distant past. Kim Taejung, and the ROK's 'Sunshine Policy' of both President Kim and President No, seem a very long way away, not only temporally but also in less tangible terms.

It is intriguing given our collective distance from the optimism and possibility of that period that *De-Bordering Korea: Tangible and Intangible Legacies of the Sunshine Policy* should emerge at all. This is an era when historical, negative legacies underpin the authority and legitimacy of the North Korean system as a whole, and efforts made to collectively forget or 'un-imagine' Southern legacies of conflict, violence, and autocracy makes tracing their remains seem somehow apposite. The locating of this study astride the philosophic and disciplinary cracks between geography and history is equally satisfying given both the acutely geographic nature of the peninsula's schismatic present and the unwinding of colonialism's topographic glitches, as manifested in varied 'hot rocks' disputes throughout the region.

Arguably spaces are always important, but in such a firmly bounded and divided domain as Korea, their navigation, co-option, and diffusion made the potential impact of 'sunshine' that much greater. Both at the time and since, what most analysts concern themselves with is the legacies of the repertoire of policies deployed during this period for the concrete spaces of domain consensus and sovereignty on the peninsula. In 2014 it is of course apparent that in terms of the higher level space of nationhood, 'sunshine' had little impact.

Of course, us geographers of a certain ilk are concerned with other sorts of spaces (other terrains of navigation) where we consider the nature and efficacy of borders and bordering themselves. 'De-bordering Korea' is constructed by a collection of scholars open to a more fluvial or porous conception of spatial possibility. With a sense that when it comes to North Korea, the lines between different social, political, and personal domains are categorically blurred. The spaces of working, social, political, cultural, and sexual lives were all exposed to potential de-bordering by 'sunshine,' and re-bordering by its diminution. Even within these liminal spaces, loci of neither threat nor danger owing to their insignificance in military terms, the Koreas engaged in furtive competition. In 'Confronting Korean identities in post-Soviet Kazakhstan,' Eunsil Yim maps the pre-sunshine engagement of a Korean diaspora once lost to the

Republic of Korea as it was subsumed within the Soviet Union. Examining a field familiar for its logistical difficulty, the recovery of linguistic capability by ethnic Koreans under Almaty/Astana's control, first at the behest of Pyongyang-affiliated institutions and then under those controlled by South Korea, Eunsil encounters a mental space of radical re-bordering. Intense competition between the spoken languages of the two Koreas for the affections and loyalty of Kazakhstan's Koreans perhaps demonstrates the willingness of all Korean institutions to reinforce extant, imagined or lost boundaries far from the soil of the peninsula.

Closely twinned with this article on navigating mental or intelligence boundaries is Alain Delissen's piece, 'The End of Romanticism: Teaching the 'Other' Korea in the Sunshine Era.' This reminded me momentarily of the logo of the Korean Society at my own university, which at one point consisted of the Korean peninsula in perfect form except for the arbitrary and cartographically brutal removal of everything north of the 38th parallel. While Delissen (p. 194) does not encounter such an abrupt and primitive un-bordering as that, he asserts: 'in the mid-1980s—the other Korea was entirely absent (indeed was forbidden) from high school level teaching in the Peninsula.' The 'sunshine' era apparently saw geography and history textbooks in the South begin the process of, not perhaps de-bordering or even re-bordering, but of psychological re-recognition of South Korea's current bordered, divided space, and of the North's existence as a separate zone of governance. This spatial bordering is accompanied with a metaphysical bordering of the nation, from the singular *minjok* to the multiple *kukmin* and *inmin*.

Other contributors are keen to trace the metaphysical and philosophic impacts of 'sunshine' as encountered by the *kukmin*, enabled by the period to cast off the opacity and impermeability of the Joint Security Area and actually visit North Korea. While the authors comment that, as is reality, trans-Korean tourism fizzled almost faster than the political impetus for 'sunshine,' South Korean journeys to both Mt. Kumgang [Kŭmgang] and Kaesong's [Gaeseong] zones of development are recounted as having made a serious impact on those involved. Christian Park's 'Crossing the border: South Korean tourism to Mount Kumgang' traces the personal crystallizations of those crossing the border on such trips. Taking into account the natural tendency of environments of border-crossing to be constructed by their attendant authorities within a 'hermeneutics of suspicion' (p. 39), the crossing of the DMZ by busloads of South Koreans appeared to, as if it were needed transfer the border itself from half imagined, liminal space to one of a distinct and threatening concrete reality. One housewife apparently recounted (p. 39) that when the North Korean border guard got on her bus to check credentials 'I almost peed in my pants when he came on the bus …. He was like a robot without any facial expression, staring at us with his sharp eyes as if he was looking for a capitalist spy.'

Of course, away from the physical crossing of military or sovereign borders lies

the social and cultural crossing or construction of borders. The book is especially strong here, in particular the analysis of Leiden's University's Koen De Ceuster. Focusing on an area of cultural imaginary and production which has, following Rüdiger Frank's landmark book 'North Korean Arts,' gained some academic focus, De Ceuster describes an un-bordering of North Korean cultural production at the behest of interested, if perhaps misguided, Southern collectors and supporters. Artistic and cultural production with Pyongyang's domain are inherently colored by ideology and charismatic narrative, though such an ideological incorporation approaches normalcy within the northern system and so is by no means strange. De Ceuster therefore considers whether Southern encounters with Northern art are actual encounters with art itself, having negated its political and therefore local and distinct identity: 'Artifacts shuttle between art worlds but are stripped of their ideological content in the process and appropriated to suit South Korean tastes' (p. 169). Perhaps such encounters not only un-border this material and the traditions, individuals, and productions structures and strategies behind it, they also transform it into 'un-art,' and the traditions and spaces behind become 'un' or 'non' spaces or traditions.

Benjamin Joinau's 'Sleeping with the (Northern) enemy: South Korean cinema and the Autistic Interface,' while in a sense the most esoteric of these pieces, also continues this theme. Joinau posits an analysis of South Korean cinematic features focused on hypothetical interactions between South and North Korean military personnel that continues the negation of North Korean social space, colonizing and commenting on the potential sexual spaces of North Korea and North Korean identity. Here North Korean masculinity, a narrative of maleness deeply caught up with cults of militarism and an anaemic sense of machismo, is de-bordered to a state of diffuse androgyny: 'This is exactly what JSA is about at a symbolic level and also what emerges in Secret Reunion, albeit in an inverted manner: a soft North Korean male mates with a rough South Korean male …' (p. 177).

A process of merging and coming together was the final destination of the more optimistic participants and actors of the 'sunshine' era. While both the political process and conceptual structures unleashed have not supported or generated that outcome in any real sense, whether tangible or intangible in form and nature, this fine collection of essays supports an extension of 'sunshine' into a multiplicity of spaces and spatial forms which have not necessarily been considered extensively before. It may be as I have hinted: rather than an exercise in de-bordering, 'sunshine' and the contemporary policies of South Korea as an encounter with its estranged northern sibling were more an exercise in 'un-bordering' or 'non-bordering.' Whereas, as tourists to Mt. Kumgang discovered, Korean borders have long formed spaces of acute militarized crystallization, unarguable, impossible to negate; the psychic and spatial diffusion during the 'sunshine' period led to a political and sovereign construct which could now be dismissed, diffuse and potentially subjected to a more complex form of negation.

Andrei Lankov, ***The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia***

Adam Cathcart, University of Leeds

Socialist nostalgia is a powerful thing in northeast Asia. North Korea's current leader Kim Jong Un [Kim Chŏngŭn] (or, more correctly perhaps, his group of handlers) has wielded it at various times, focusing often on the period of state formation, the years from 1945–1948. Kim Jong-un's land reforms put forward in June 2012 were therefore an echo of his grandfather's reforms of 1946, and were explicitly interpreted as such in state media. North Korean state propaganda has described with some joyousness the parallels between the new leader and the optimism of the early liberation era.

One of the great aspects of Andrei Lankov's work is the inherent warning it possesses about presentism, or reading North Korean history backwards. In other words, it would be erroneous to assume that the ostensibly repressed post-famine rage of the North Korean population had been preceded by decades of resentment or hunger. The oft-repeated bromide that after the Korean War, the DPRK outstripped the ROK in terms of industrial output and other economic measures until the early 1970s still applies here; the state's grain supply for individuals lasted from 1957 until the 1990s. Complain if one must about foreign subsidies that propped this system up, but the ability to feed the populace was interpreted certainly as a cornerstone of Kimist legitimacy, along with nationalism and a sense of siege identity.

Socialist nostalgia for the pure and participatory era of state consolidation is, of course, not merely a North Korean phenomenon and it is shared in the region. Scholars in Chinese Studies are returning increasingly to the era of state formation in the People's Republic of China, the state founded in 1949. Here the North Koreans can legitimately pose themselves as the elder brothers of the Chinese, as they were 'present at the creation' of the PRC.) While the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) are seen as the great traumatic acts, increasingly attention is being turned to the early 1950s, and specifically how violent they were.

The DPRK had a war from 1950–53, but it had nothing whatsoever like the Chinese effective creation and repression of 'deviant' populations. Most left in 1946, and those who had not left or were killed in the midst of the Korean War, like Cho Man-sik. North Korea has never had a society-upheaval massive purge along the lines of those unleashed by Stalin in 1937 or Mao's chaotic variant. Apart from the massive rupture of the Korean War, North Korean society was remarkably stable, until the famine changed the equation. But is is still rather stable, if not, because one unhinged editorial in *The Guardian* wrote, because the people were all 'brainwashed.'

Lankov is particularly well-suited to comment on such continuities because he is a historian, and a particularly talented one.

Andrei Lankov's attractive book functions as a gloss on, and a distillation of, his previous work. In that sense it is rather like Bruce Cumings' miniaturized *The Korean War* (Modern Library, 2011). This is not a text where a great deal of new research will be trotted out, nor is it clotted up with footnotes from the author's new research. But taking the time to reflect, and having the ability to write with some salt, is worth a great deal. Factionalism and purges are a vital element in Lankov's contribution to the historiography, and this text revisits some of that work. Kim Jong Un has seen his moment in history with Ri Yong Ho [Ri Yŏng-ho] and Jang Sung Taek [Chang Sŏng-t'aek], but these quick purges were nothing compared to the long series of internecine battles—bureaucratic and otherwise—that Kim Il Sung [Kim Il-song] had with his own cohort. These historical episodes, looking again at how Kim settled into power, are particularly useful to revisit today as a scattering of other new 'competitor books' seek to reinterpret the Manchurian guerrilla experience.

Before the Korean War, Lankov tells us, Kim Il Sung was 'one of many North Korean Communist leaders, merely a *primus inter pares* in Pyongyang—one whose slightly special standing was largely, or even exclusively, derived from Soviet support.' That was in the years primary to the massive inflating of a historical personality cult, a task undertaken by Kim Jong Il for his own reasons. (Kim took a fateful trip up to the Chinese frontier in 1967, where he was haunted by the clangor of the Red Guards across the river as he sought to build the massive Pochonbo Battle Monument.)

There is an abridged explanation of the factional struggles and purges within the WPK that followed from 1953–1956, done in a style reminiscent of his 2005 text *Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956*. Revealing how many of Kim Il Sung's comrades were purged, Lankov notes dryly: 'Only two of the ten members of that initial Politburo were killed by their enemies rather than by their comrades' (p. 14).

How useful is such a legacy for Kim Jong Un? Lankov chooses not to connect those particular dots. But while Kim Il Sung was surrounded by men who had commanded, in many cases, their own militia—Mu Chong, for example—today Kim Jong Un is surrounded by the descendants of the victors of those very purges. Family guardians, and myths of perfect unity existing since the early days, remain stronger than ever.

Hazel Smith, *North Korea: Markets and Military Rule*

Robert Winstanley-Chesters, Australian National University

North Korea is a sovereign space surrounded on all metaphorical, analytical and conceptual sides by common sense. It is common sense that Pyongyang's government is an autocratic, reactionary outlier, a dinosaur of politics and ideology, long past

its expected expiration. It is common sense that its government, bureaucracy, elite and leadership simply abrogate and neglect their commitments under any conception of a social contract between ruler and people, failing to provide sustenance, safety or security in any sense. It is common sense that North Korea is a direct military and diplomatic threat to its immediate neighbours, its nuclear capacity one of the great known unknowns of global security calculation. It is common sense that North Korea uses nefarious and illegal means to fund itself, contravening international and national legislation at all levels. It is common sense that the only future for North Korea is collapse, dissolution and absorption into the body politic of its threatened and more worthy southern neighbour, the Republic of Korea. It is common sense that its leadership and bureaucracy are culpable for crimes against natural law, order and humanity and must be punished according to the frameworks and statutes of international law. These things are all common sense, things we know, the corporeal body of vernacular, academic and governmental consensus on a global level.

Common sense is of course as contested a terminological device as any other in these fractured, difficult times and the statistical grounds for many elements of common sense are widely critiqued and broken down. Indeed, the contestability of the wider body of Liberal common sense is one of the key features of the public, media and popular body politic of reaction post 9–11 and COP 15. What is never contested or contradicted is the terrain and ground of acceptable conversation and consideration that births and maintains such a common sense.

Chomsky in his analysis of what he terms 'Cartesian Common Sense' decries the grounding of that common sense in the bed of expertise and apparently accumulated knowledge which sets (apparently coincidentally) its own shallow, meagre limits in order to essentially dictate the space of debate, speech, thought and deed (Chomsky, 1983). While this reviewer cannot imagine Hazel Smith summoning Chomsky urgently to mind in the construction of her book *North Korea: Markets and Military Rule*, she cogently and coherently describes the space of academic, political and intellectual knowledge surrounding Pyongyang in intriguingly similar terms.

Professor Smith's now famous maxim that North Korea was presented to history and the public as either 'mad, bad or sad' (Smith, 2000), by academic analysis and common sense, serves as the disappointed, frustrated starting point for this book. *North Korea: Markets and Military Rule* is on the face of it an authoritative and comprehensive refresher course in not only the history of North Korea's ideology, governmentality, economics and military capacity and the narratives of the wider world's diplomatic efforts and engagements with it. However Smith equally provides a tart, assertive moment of reckoning for bodies of knowledge surrounding what we know about North Korea.

Extremely well organised and structured, Smith takes the perhaps uninitiated through the full panoply of North Korean historical periodisation—moving from

the depths of Japanese colonial occupation and to the imagined high points of triangulative socialism, then finally arriving back at the misery and 'darkness' of the famine and what for Pyongyang seems like the death of both optimism and the future. In common with other interesting research from recent years, Smith moves in the final third of the book, to the second half of its title, exploring the extraordinary fact of North Korea's accommodation with capitalist stores of value and an ad-hoc market system. Unlike other work on the matter, however, *North Korea: Markets and Military Rule* takes a holistic approach to the study, considering the impact of capitalist modes and practices of being in the round and their impact on the social and familial spaces and politics of North Korea.

In two fascinating sections in its later stages the book encounters empirically similar spaces to those investigated from an anthropological perspective through the interview material in Sandra Fahy's recent *Marching Through Suffering*. Fahy's interviewees experience death and misery on their doorsteps and in front of the local train station, crisis brought about by North Korea's difficulties in the early 1990s and through the ebbing away of state support from peripheral and non-core populations in favour of marketized self-reliance. In common with the explosion of deprivation seen in post-Soviet Russia and the wider eastern Europe, the much vaunted and celebrated process of marketization is not entirely a good, but means that 'In marketized North Korea, the worst off were the elderly, and adults and children who could not call on family support …' (274).

Categorizing the impact of both economic marketization and acute social changes brought about by the diminution and diffusion of political control as 'the end of the monolith,' Smith explores the ground of the new realities in North Korea through extensive use of UNICEF and North Korean Census Bureau statistics. This analysis reveals some extraordinary, yet virtually overlooked facts of the post-monolithic era, from the collapse in attendance rates at school, to the appearance of teenage pregnancy as a social issue and statistical fact in North Korea (273). Smith, though, is rigorously fair as the cracks in Pyongyang's system are laid bare, so credit and comment is given focused on the utility and functionality of North Korea's health infrastructure in the post-famine period. Professor Smith recounts progress in reducing infant mortality rates (270) and success in the reducing the prevalence of both tuberculosis and malaria within North Korea's population (271). While this success perhaps could be credited in part to the interjection of United Nation's agencies such as the World Health Organisation, Smith notes the WHO's own assessment that such progress was due to 'effective societal organisation' (271).

The notion of crediting North Korean capabilities and abilities where credit is due, may of course be anathema to some, but a hallmark of Smith's empirical sensibilities have been her considered fairness, and North Korea Markets and Military Rule is no different. Likewise and perhaps returning to this reviews prognostication

surrounding the notion of common sense surrounding North Korea, Smith is perfectly comfortable calling out obfuscation and prevarication when it comes to academic reliability. This book in a sense is a master class in the deployment of footnotes to add content to a discussion and weight to an argument or denunciation. Smith's untangling of webs or circles of 'common sense' surrounding in particular evidence for North Korean criminal activity, in footnotes on pages 36 and 37 for example is utterly extraordinary. Likewise Smith's emplacement of North Korea within a more contextual frame of global deprivation and governmental failure (32–33) is an act of academic rigor seldom seen.

Ultimately *North Korea: Markets and Military Rule* serves as the most valuable of texts, a benchmark and at times an almost medicinal corrective to which the academic genre of North Korean studies could return to regain its epistemic and empirical bearings after moments of hyperbole and hyperventilation. Smith's fine work will, this reviewer is sure underpin academic courses and modules the (English-speaking) world over, a work of reference and return.

Hyun Ok Park, *The Capitalist Unconscious: From Korean Unification to Transnational Korea*

Christopher Green, Leiden University

Crisis as a driver of social change is scarcely a new idea. The desire to fundamentally alter the status quo appears to transcend partisan politics. Perhaps that is inevitable, for if one didn't want to change the world, why would one go into politics in the first place? The only missing ingredient is the right and proper moment.

But whereas some envision crisis in terms of opening political space for powerful elites to remake the world in a positive sense, Hyun Ok Park, with a Marxist historical brief, sees instead a free-floating process of unification of the two Koreas and their Korean-Chinese brethren rising from the ashes of societies reconfigured by the multiple crises of capitalism that beset Northeast Asia in the 1990s. That is, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which did and continues to demand greater labor flexibility from South Korean workers; and the collapse of state distribution in North Korea in the years immediately preceding, which triggered a rush to one or other of Albert Hirschman's exits—to China for some, and to a parallel system of market exchange for most.

Park's news is that these contiguous crises mean unification is already here; it is only the blinkered tendency of most to treat the nation-state as the only acceptable ordering principle of social life that obscures this stark reality. When North Koreans cross the Tumen and Yalu rivers, they form part of the 'osmosis' of economic migration that is happening more or less everywhere, more or less all the time. Likewise for

the remittances that flow north from Seoul and elsewhere in South Korea; the tens of thousands of ethnically Korean Chinese who, under a liberal visa regime, flow to the South annually; and all the intermediaries who facilitate these mass capital and human flows. On the other side of the coin, however, there is little or no room for transmogrifying these flows of people and capital into a lever for a new mass politics that might, in its turn, alter the way of things in a positive, productive manner. Efforts are made, but the target is slippery, and transnational capital never grants that kind of space; this is an impersonal response to crisis, at best.

Park's is an exciting, fresh vision. However, her conceptualization is also watery and open to ready critique. First and foremost, disjuncture rather than unity tends to prevail. Put the book down, look out of the window of a Dandong inn, and what you will see is a level of integration between the three economies that still depends heavily on contravening the will of state(s) through illegal and semi-legal border crossings of goods and people, and that is without the overwhelming economic and political differentials that foster strict social hierarchies and biases among the populations themselves. Transnational capital is powerful, yes, and we would be wise to thank Park for slicing through the demagoguery that hides this fact behind social discourses of democracy and freedom. This has always been the benefit conferred by Marxist historical analysis. But for all that, politics isn't going anywhere. Borders are not wide open, and the majority of North Koreans shall never go across to the other side.

Moreover, while 'Transnational Korea' may be a real construct, it is far from being one of Ian Lustick's 'ideologically hegemonic' ones. Recent clashes between labour and capital in South Korea highlight the point that labour is up for the fight. Despite serious doubts about both motivation and competence, politicians and civil society leaders (including Seoul City's left-wing mayor, Park Won-soon [Pak Wŏnsun]) still debate alternative ways of organizing society—economics with a sociological component, in Bourdieu's encapsulation—even though their chances of revolutionary change are—and frankly should be—slim.

In September 2015, a single toppled truck on the World War II-era bridge across the Yalu at Dandong was enough to paralyze legal trade into North Korea from China for days. North Koreans who attempt to cross a river to ply trade or make the indirect and perilous leap toward South Korea are prevented by force from doing so. It is best to view Park's exceptional vision as lighting the lamps on a possible path, deftly highlighting the notion that apolitical trade and capital flows are in the process of unifying Northeast Asia as an economic entity, irrespective and disrespecting of political power in the hands of the region's leaders—elected and unelected alike. But the picture she paints is not the done deal that is implied in this work of breadth and ambition.

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF KOREAN STUDIES 2017–2018

NOTES FOR SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPTS TO THE *EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF KOREAN STUDIES*

The European Journal of Korean Studies is a fully peer-reviewed, on-line journal which has been published since 1991 (formerly the *Papers of the British Association of Korean Studies*). Volumes 1–16 are available free for BAKS members from www.baks.org.uk or by emailing Tristan Webb (treasurer@baks.org.uk).

The journal accepts manuscripts for articles within any area of the arts, humanities and social sciences which examine Korea in either contemporary or historical times. Submissions which include a comparative discussion of issues in other East Asian nations are welcome.

Persons submitting articles for consideration should note the following requirements:

1) Articles should be submitted only in English, using British spelling conventions.

2) The body of the manuscript should normally be around 5,000 words in length. Endnotes, bibliography, and other additional material are excluded from this word count.

3) The manuscript should use endnotes and follow the 'Chicago style' for references.

4) Romanization of East Asian names, place names and terms should follow the McCune-Reischauer system for Korean, Hepburn for Japanese, and pinyin for Chinese. Terms not given in one of these standard Romanizations should be followed by the standard Romanization enclosed in square brackets [ ] at the initial occurrence.

5) Where appropriate, the use of Chinese characters and indigenous scripts following the initial occurrence of a term is encouraged.

6) The manuscript should be submitted as a Microsoft Word file attachment and should be written in double-spaced Times Roman 12 point font. This rule applies to both the text of the article and its section headings.

7) The page format should be set for A4 size with **left-hand justification only**.

8) The manuscript should have a separate cover page which gives the full name of the author, academic affiliation, and full postal and email contact details. The cover page should also have a one-paragraph summary of the contents of the article, and five (5) key words.

9) The first page of the text of the manuscript should have only the title of the article at top. The name of the author(s) should NOT be included.

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